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“For unto whom much is given, of him shall much be required; and to
whom men have committed much, of him they will ask more.”
Luke 12:48 1
“[G]reat power involves great responsibility.”
Franklin Delano Roosevelt 2
John Thompson’s death sentence was overturned. The prosecutor had
withheld forensic evidence proving Thompson’s innocence. Thompson served
eighteen years in prison. 3
Three Duke lacrosse players were charged with rape. The prosecutor was
aware that the “victim” had lied. The Attorney General dropped all of the
charges a year later. 4
Mark Sodersten’s murder conviction was overturned. The prosecutor had
withheld exonerative audiotapes. Sodersten served twenty-two years and died
in prison six months before his conviction was reversed. 5
William Ruehle was indicted for backdating stock options. The prosecutor
intimidated the defense’s witnesses to prevent them from testifying. A federal
judge ultimately dismissed the charges, citing “shameful” conduct by
prosecutor. 6
Michael Morton served twenty-five years in prison for murder. The
prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. Morton was later
exonerated by DNA evidence. 7
Senator Ted Stevens was convicted of fraud weeks before commencing his
sixth re-election campaign for the U.S. Senate. The prosecutor failed to disclose

1. Some say that an appeal to religious authority constitutes harmful error. See, e.g.,
Sandoval v. Calderon, 231 F.3d 1140, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ny suggestion that the jury
may base its decision on a ‘higher law’ than that of the court in which it sits is forbidden.”); see
also KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE
PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA
1997-2002, at 22, 30–31 (2010).
2. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Undelivered Address Prepared for Jefferson Day (April 13, 1945),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16602.
3. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011).
4. Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337–38 (2007).
5. In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576, 610–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also RIDOLFI
& POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4.
6. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 601–02, 613 (9th Cir. 2009); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY,
supra note 1, at 18; see also Stuart Pfeifer & E. Scott Reckard, Broadcom Fraud Charges
Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1, A16.
7. Morton v. State of Texas, 761 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); see also Ex parte
Morton, No. AP-76663, 2011 WL 4827841, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2011) (per curiam).
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exculpatory evidence. Two and a half years later, the verdict was set aside and
the indictment was dismissed. 8
Two truths: (1) prosecutors have awesome powers, and (2) “crime is
contagious.” 9 In a civil society, a prosecutor’s deliberate decision to misuse his
power usurps foundational trust in the judicial system. The American criminal
justice system is at its fairest when both sides adhere to the rules. 10 It is at its
worst “when any accused is treated unfairly.” 11 Although society agrees on
these general principles, it cannot seem to agree on what to do with those who
abuse the system. 12
To be clear, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are relatively rare. 13
However, when prosecutors abuse their power—causing harm to individuals
fighting for their liberty—they too often go unpunished and are therefore
encouraged to repeat the unethical conduct. 14 Although the injustice is greater
when it harms the innocent, 15 prosecutorial misconduct is still unjust when it
harms the guilty, who, regardless of their crimes, are entitled to the full
protection of the Constitution. 16

8. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231(EGS), 2009 WL 6525926, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7,
2009); see Paul Kane, Sen. Ted Stevens Loses Reelection Bid, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2008, at
A1–A2 (describing the trial’s impact on Senator Stevens’s campaign).
9. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“A prosecutor has a duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction. . . . [W]hile he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the
law . . . it invites anarchy.”). Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity,
2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 124 (2005) (“Prosecutors who engage in misconduct strike not just hard
blows, but criminal blows.”).
10. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair. . . .”).
11. Id.
12. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 964–65 (2009) (discussing disagreement over regulating the conduct of
prosecutors).
13. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987); see also Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors and
Corrupt Science, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 448 (2007) (noting that there is little information about
prosecutorial misconduct).
14. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 409–16 (2001). See generally Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the
Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1083 (1994) (observing that punishment for prosecutorial misconduct is relatively
uncommon).
15. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 64–66 (“It is impossible to overestimate the
magnitude of the wrong done to an innocent person wrongfully convicted of a crime. The
psychological, emotional and economic harm can be equivalent to the destruction of a life.”).
16. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Prosecutorial misconduct is an important
issue for us as a society, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendants involved in
the individual cases.”); Davis, supra note 14, at 408–13, 422–37 (explaining that prosecutorial
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It seems irresponsible for a civil society, founded upon bedrock principles of
integrity and honor, to tolerate unscrupulous actors with such far-reaching
power. 17 These prosecutors cannot be voted out of office (though their bosses
can be), and they are rarely punished for their misdeeds through the traditional
channels, such as by judicial condemnation, bar association sanctions, or
criminal prosecution. 18 Consequently, those channels are not an adequate
deterrent. 19 While errant prosecutors who are caught abusing their office may
feel the sting of a wrist-slap just long enough to reach for their local government
policy handbook, they are likely to forget which aspect of their ethical
obligations they intended to refresh in their mind by the time they have located
the table of contents. Such is the unfortunate consequence of the ineffective
sanctions levied against misbehaving prosecutors.
Because prosecutors are not subject to civil liability for misconduct, 20 they
must be subject to some sort of meaningful disciplinary action. Academics and
practitioners considering the problem of punishing prosecutorial misconduct
agree that the disciplinary measures in place are grossly inadequate. 21 Most
misconduct, such as overcharging, abuse of the grand jury process, and the introduction of improper
evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional rights).
17. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Prosecutorial misconduct fundamentally
perverts the course of justice and costs taxpayers millions of dollars in protracted litigation. It
undermines our trust in the reliability of the justice system and subverts the notion that we are a
fair society.”).
18. Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–89 (noting that only “head prosecutors” are subject to
political checks and can be voted out of office).
19. See David Keenan, Deborah J. Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
203, 208–09 (2011) (highlighting Justice Thomas’s language in Connick v. Thompson, which
explained that a prosecutor’s broad ability to make legal judgments is not indicative of
constitutional danger); see also Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 92 (2005) (emphasizing
that it is an unusual case in which a court explicitly concludes that the prosecutor committed
misconduct and refers the case for punishment).
20. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 14, at 457–61 & n.364 (discussing the need for a misconduct
review board, which was originally proposed in the Citizen Protection Act of 1998); Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 453–55 (1992) (suggesting national
judicial commissions as a method by which to address prosecutorial misconduct); Natasha Minsker,
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 398–403 (2009)
(lamenting the lack of effective remedies to combat prosecutorial misconduct); Lorraine Morey,
Keeping the Dragon Slayers in Check: Reining in Prosecutorial Misconduct, 5 PHOENIX L. REV.
617, 619 (2011) (recognizing the need for an independent prosecutorial commission to regulate and
discipline prosecutorial behavior and to disclose, in each case, the offending prosecutor’s name, the
outcome of any investigation, and any discipline that was imposed); Morton, supra note 14, at 1114
(“[D]isciplinary systems currently in place to remedy and deter prosecutorial misconduct are
inadequate to handle the amount and nature of the ethical violations courts regularly witness.”);
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 982–83
(1984) (proposing that every state adopt legislation similar to a Texas statute that created a
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recognize that, although misconduct should not be tolerated, the lack of
accountability results in implicit acceptance of wrongdoing. 22 To deter further
misconduct and abuse of power, prosecutors must be punished more severely
than attorneys who hold less distinguished and privileged positions. 23 For
example, prosecutors guilty of misconduct could be punished as willful
perjurers, which can carry a heavy penalty. 24
Although this approach may seem too draconian, meaningful and actionable
reform is long overdue. More must be done to protect citizens from the
unintended and far-reaching consequences of a prosecutor’s deliberate decision
to flout the Constitution and her ethical obligations. Accordingly, this Article
proposes establishing independent commissions charged with investigating
prosecutorial misconduct at all levels and equipped with the power to sanction,
suspend, or disbar prosecutors who abuse their positions.
This Article begins by setting forth the proper role of prosecutors. The Article
then examines the prevalence and consequences of prosecutorial misconduct and
identifies the primary types of prosecutorial misconduct. Part IV surveys the
disciplinary efforts of several jurisdictions, and Part V dissects the inadequacies
of current practices in coping with the problem. Next, the Article critiques the
proposals set forth by others to address prosecutorial abuse. Part VII analyzes
the methodology and effectiveness of independent judicial commissions as a
model for commissions regarding prosecutors. Finally, the Article proposes
establishing independent commissions to effectively investigate and sanction
prosecutors guilty of misconduct.

mechanism for policing and imposing sanctions on prosecutors for their misconduct); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 276, 297–98 (2004) (noting that the current “slap on the wrist”
disciplinary scheme fails to deter misconduct); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 776 (2001) (acknowledging the proposals of other commentators
to establish an independent body to address prosecutorial misconduct and suggesting that, while
such a measure may be “overenthusiastic[],” it is nevertheless necessary).
22. Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 277 (“While all courts, prosecutors, and defenders would
certainly agree that it is ‘highly reprehensible’ to suppress facts or secrete evidence ‘capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused,’ when it happens, the disciplinary consequence is often
nil . . . . [T]here appears to be an implicit agreement that, absent rare circumstances, offending
prosecutors should not be subject to sanctions before disciplinary committees.”); see also Bibas,
supra note 12, at 965–68 (noting that state legislatures have an incentive to give broad powers to
prosecutors in order to reduce crime); Green, supra note 19, at 69–70 (explaining that many
prosecutors fail to fulfill their ethical duties and that current enforcement mechanisms are
inadequate to remedy the problem).
23. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 75.
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 128 (West 1999) (“Every person who, by willful perjury
or subornation of perjury procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person, is
punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole.”).
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I. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
“Anyone entrusted with power will abuse it if not also animated with
the love of truth and virtue, no matter whether he be a prince, or one
of the people.”
Jean de La Fontaine
Prosecutors are at the heart of the criminal justice system. 25 They initiate the
process, 26 prioritize the process, 27 and, to a great extent, determine the outcome
of the process. 28 For the American criminal justice system to function as
intended, prosecutors must temper their power by fulfilling the ethical and
professional duties owed to the defendants they prosecute. 29
While a prosecutor has an obligation to prosecute vigorously, she has a
corresponding duty to ensure a just result and to avoid wrongfully convicting
innocent defendants. 30 Indeed, “the prosecutor is not only the defendant’s
adversary, but is also the ‘. . . guardian of the defendant’s constitutional
rights.’” 31 She may not “act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes
the protection afforded by the right to counsel.” 32 Unfortunately, idealistic
words espousing the merits of an adversarial system can easily be lost in the
rough-and-tumble of the competitive, and often mean-spirited, world of criminal
trials. 33 Frequently, lofty notions of the prosecutor prince holding himself above

25. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934); Morton, supra note 14, at 1086
(“[Prosecutors] occupy a unique position in our adversarial system.”).
26. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L 223, 224–25
(2006).
27. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
997 (2006) (observing that prosecutors “make key decisions in criminal matters”).
28. See Langer, supra note 26, at 224–25 (arguing that prosecutors control the outcome of
criminal matters because they control charging, guilty pleas, and sentencing). The Supreme Court
has curtailed some of the power of state and federal prosecutors to control sentencing through the
use of sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–46 (2005) (holding
that federal sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, but rather advisory, unless the defendant
admits facts necessary to enhance a sentence or the government proves them beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (invalidating state sentencing
guidelines that permitted prosecutors to enhance punishments without proving to a jury the acts
essential to the punishment); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (holding that any
increase in the penalty for a crime must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial).
29. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1086–87.
30. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (“It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.”).
31. People v. Sherrick, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v.
Trevino, 704 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)).
32. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985).
33. See, e.g., id. at 171 (overturning a conviction based on a coerced confession); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 415–16 (1976) (detailing the false and misleading testimony introduced
and the exculpatory evidence suppressed by the prosecution); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
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the fray give way to the grisly reality of trials that discredit and demean all
participants, including the prosecutor. 34
Abstract notions of the prosecutor’s role presented in judicial opinions lack
the specificity needed to properly guide the conduct of prosecutors. 35 Similarly
vague is the general admonition in the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (MRPC), which places an affirmative duty on all
lawyers to report misconduct of other lawyers. 36
As a response to the dearth of guidance, the MRPC set forth generalized
guidelines that apply to all lawyers, 37 as well as heightened responsibilities
specific to prosecutors. 38 The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice also impose heightened standards on prosecutors, including a specific
duty to protect the rights of the defendant. 39 Beyond these non-specific notions
of how prosecutors must conduct themselves in the real world of the criminal
justice system, there are few concrete rules of conduct and even fewer specific
consequences that may ensue for errant behavior.

201, 205–06 (1964) (illustrating the prosecutor’s use of incriminating statements he knew would
violate the Constitution).
34. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (explaining that the prosecutor’s role is to see that justice is
done).
35. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362–63 (citing rules governing
prosecutors’ behavior without explaining their practical use).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2013) (“A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.”). The comment accompanying Rule 8.3 further
clarifies that “[t]he term ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of the possible offense.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (2013); see also Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The
Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391,
432–33, 431 n.156 (2011) (discussing the model rules).
37. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and
the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 223–24 & n.2 (1993) (noting
that the Model Rules define “the posture lawyers should take in a variety of situations”).
38. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (“The responsibility of a
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.”); see also Washington v. Hofbaur, 228 F.3d 689, 709 (6th Cir. 2000) (cautioning that “a
prosecutor must be doubly careful to stay within the bounds of proper conduct”).
39. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 90 & n.97 (citing the applicable ABA
standards).
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II. PREVALENCE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Given the number of prosecutions in this country, wrongful convictions are
inevitable. Mistaken identification, 40 forensic errors, 41 lying witnesses, 42 and
perjuring police officers 43 all contribute to errors in the system. Those errors,
although regrettable, are not the prosecutor’s. Rather, when prosecutors err, the
system itself becomes suspect. In recent years, prosecutors have been
responsible for a number of astonishing instances of wrongful conviction. 44
Wrongful convictions hinder valuable societal interests, 45 diminish the integrity
of the legal system, and foster a lack of faith in American justice. 46 Moreover,
lest we lose sight of the obvious, a wrongful conviction results in fundamental
injustice to a defendant by jeopardizing his livelihood, reputation, finances, and

40. The majority of wrongful convictions involved misidentification. Margery Malkin
Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42
CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2009) (discussing a National Institute of Justice study that
reported that mistaken identification contributed to more than seventy-five percent of 183 DNA
exonerations).
41. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFIELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 361 (2003)
(noting that thirty-four percent of wrongful convictions “are obtained through forensics that is
either incorrect or purposely falsified”).
42. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30–32 (1957) (per curiam) (describing a case in
which the prosecutor instructed a testifying witness to not volunteer exculpatory evidence); see also
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111 (1935) (per curiam) (considering a petition for clemency
based on the prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony and suppression of evidence that would
impeach the lying witnesses). The most fundamental form of prosecutorial misconduct during trial
is the knowing use of perjured testimony. George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial Accountability After
Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 199, 204, 207 (2011) (recognizing that subornation of
perjury was the first type of prosecutorial misconduct that was determined to violate a defendant’s
right to due process); see also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1414–15 (2007) (identifying the testimony of lying expert witnesses as a
contributing factor to wrongful convictions).
43. Michael Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Police
Perjury, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1259, 1265–69 (2005) (citing “overwhelming anecdotal
evidence of widespread police perjury in our criminal justice system”); Gershman, supra note 21,
at 397–98 (describing a situation in which police bribed public officials).
44. Davis, supra note 14, at 410–12.
45. Weiss, supra note 42, at 120; see also Harmful Error, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/harmful-error (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (providing
several articles that discuss prosecutorial misconduct and its effect on society).
46. See Weiss, supra note 42, at 217 & n.210 (arguing that “widespread misconduct by
prosecutors leads to a lack of public faith”).
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psychological well-being. 47 While the courts afford “great deference” to
prosecutors’ integrity, 48 that trust is not always warranted. 49
For example, one national study cited over 11,000 cases of prosecutorial
misconduct, reporting that prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in the reversal,
dismissal, or reduction of the defendant’s sentence in roughly 2,000 of those
cases. 50 Another nationwide survey, focusing on capital cases, revealed a
sixty-eight percent rate of reversible error from prosecutorial misconduct. 51 The
study found that, between 1980 and 1999, twenty-one percent of the wrongful
convictions considered were reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct. 52 In a
third study, the New York State Bar Association’s Task Force for Wrongful
Convictions examined fifty-three cases of wrongful conviction, over half of
which may have involved misconduct by the government. 53
III. TYPES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Prosecutorial misconduct includes, but is not limited to, Brady violations,
overcharging, witness tampering, suborning perjury, Batson errors, improper
argument, and the introduction of improper evidence.
A. Brady Violations: The Failure to Provide Required Discovery
A prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is the most frequent
abuse of prosecutorial power. 54 Although the disclosure requirement set forth
in Brady v. Maryland 55 and its progeny is well established, Brady violations
47. Id. at 217.
48. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364–65 (1991) (explaining that the deference
awarded to prosecutors in the context of peremptory jury strikes, with which courts assume
prosecutors act with great integrity and credibility).
49. See David G. Savage, Registry Tallies Over 2,000 Wrongful Convictions Since 1989, L.A.
TIMES, May 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/20/nation/la-na-dna-revolution
-20120521 (reporting that California, especially Los Angeles County, has exonerated a large
number of wrongfully convicted defendants, in part because of prosecutorial misconduct).
50. Weiss, supra note 42, at 217–18. The 2,000 cases cited did not include cases that were
not reversed or cases in which misconduct, although present, was not the cause of reversal. Id. at
218. Additionally, this figure may underestimate and neglect to distinguish between forms of
misconduct. Id. at 218–19.
51. Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death Penalty: What Went
Wrong?, 34 MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 409–10 (2001).
52. Hartman & Richards, supra note 51, at 423.
53. TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTION 6–7 (2009)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR], available at
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26663 (finding that “general errors by
a government actor” contributed to wrongful conviction in thirty-one of the fifty-three cases in the
study).
54. Davis, supra note 14, at 431 (noting that the breadth of the prosecutor’s obligations under
Brady leave room for wrongdoing).
55. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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continue to plague the criminal justice system. Prosecutors are well aware that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment.” 56 Prosecutors are also aware that they must disclose evidence that,
if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 57 Furthermore, they
are conscious of the significance of witness credibility and of their obligation to
disclose evidence material to witness impeachment. 58 While the precise
parameters of Brady continue to be refined, its basic premise is well defined and
completely clear to criminal attorneys. 59 Ignorance of Brady obligations is
seldom a reason for non-disclosure.
The battle for discovery often focuses on the timing of the Brady disclosure. 60
Prosecutors may disclose the necessary discovery, but often do so too late in the
pre-trial process to allow defense counsel to evaluate and utilize the material
properly. 61 Under these circumstances, the trial court could delay the trial to
give defense counsel time to evaluate and possibly assimilate the newly acquired
evidence into the defense case. However, continuance of the trial date is at the
discretion of the court, and, even if granted, may not be sufficient for defense
counsel to make full use of the recently acquired material. 62 Furthermore,

56. Id.
57. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985) (quoting Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)) (explaining the requirement to disclose material information); see also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (explaining that suppressing material evidence
violates a defendant’s due process rights).
58. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (noting that nondisclosure of “evidence affecting credibility”
violates Brady).
59. Attorneys in every state are required to comply with ethics rules. See CPR POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND COMMENTS (2011), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that every state
has adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The ABA imposes
additional ethical obligations on prosecutors, including the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7–103(B) (2012) (“A public prosecutor or other
government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant,
or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or
other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment.”). The ABA Model Rules also eliminate a prosecutor’s
discretion with regard to disclosure requirements and expressly prohibits presentation of false
testimony. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8(d) (2013).
60. Michael A. Collora & William A. Haddad, Exculpatory Evidence—Getting It and Using
It, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 16, 17–18 (emphasizing the importance of timely Brady requests and
disclosures for defense counsel).
61. Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 543, 558–61 (2006) (discussing the effect of late discovery on an
innocent defendant’s choice to plead guilty).
62. See id. at 600 n.238 (noting trial courts’ reluctance to change trial dates).
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judges and court administrators are typically reticent to continue trials that
complicate their calendars. 63
Additionally, exculpatory evidence may not come to light until after trial. The
only likely remedy in such cases is a new trial (if the disclosure so permits), 64 or
an appeal, in which the harmless error doctrine dramatically reduces the
defendant’s chances of success. 65 In yet other cases, prosecutors may never
disclose discoverable materials.
Typical sanctions for Brady violations might include a verbal admonition
from a trial judge, or perhaps a rebuke by an appellate court, that will likely have
no effect on the verdict under harmless error rationale. 66 More severe sanctions
are rare, and, as a result, prosecutors are emboldened by their success in
obtaining guilty verdicts by unethical means. 67
B. Overcharging
The prosecutor’s exclusive role as the charging agent and as the negotiator in
the inevitable case-disposition process is fraught with the potential for abuse. 68
The expectation of plea bargaining provides an incentive to prosecutors to better
position themselves for negotiation. 69 Charging a greater offense than the
defendant’s conduct warrants, or adding an enhancement of little merit, gives an
unfair advantage to the prosecutor. 70 Although it may seem counterintuitive to
charge crimes that the prosecutor cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
overcharging forces the defendant to determine whether going to trial is worth

63. See Johns, supra note 9, at 66 (citing political concerns—the fear of appearing soft on
crime—as one reason judges do not address misconduct); cf. Ginny Sloan, Congress Must Act to
End Prosecutorial Misconduct, HUFF POST, (Apr. 11, 2012, 11:41 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ginny-sloan/congress-must-act-to-end-_b_1415695.html (arguing
that courts cannot solve the problem of prosecutorial misconduct).
64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (authorizing a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires”).
65. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219–20 (1982).
66. See Davis, supra note 14, at 412 (noting that reversal following a Brady violation is rare);
Gershman, supra note 21, at 424–25 (arguing that the harmless error rule indicates to prosecutors
that their misconduct will be ignored).
67. See Davis, supra note 14. A prosecutor may not be compelled to bring or drop charges
and what charges to bring are vested upon his judgment. McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
311–12 (1987); Gershman, supra note 21, at 408–11 nn.95–97.
68. See Gershman, supra note 21, at 405–06 (describing the prosecutor’s broad discretionary
power).
69. H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 84 (2011).
70. Davis, supra note 14, at 413 (suggesting that prosecutors overcharge to create leverage
for plea bargaining); see also Langer, supra note 26, at 240 (arguing that, because prosecutors
control the charges in a criminal case, they have the ability to “threaten defendants with trial
sentences that are not appropriate to the case”).
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the risk of the devastating penalties the inflated charges carry. 71 Given such a
difficult choice, defendants may plead to charges beyond their level of
culpability to eliminate the risk of greater consequences.
Overcharging to gain a competitive advantage in the give-and-take of plea
bargaining is an insidious abuse of the prosecutor’s power. 72 The MRPC
requirement that prosecutors bring only those charges supported by probable
cause 73 is inadequate to address overcharging because probable cause is a
minimal threshold that is well below what is required to convict. 74
Consequently, the MRPC is insufficient to deter unprincipled prosecutors from
overcharging to gain a tactical advantage.
C. Witness Tampering
Prosecutorial misconduct may extend as far as deliberate interference with or
an attempt to influence the testimony of witnesses at trial. 75 Prosecutors are
ethically bound to communicate with witnesses and the defendant
Improper witness examinations, misrepresentation of
appropriately. 76
information, intimidation of witnesses, deliberate communication with the
defendant outside the presence of counsel, or interference with defense counsel’s
access to witnesses or defendants while preparing her case may all constitute
prosecutorial misconduct. 77
The federal witness tampering statute criminalizes the use of intimidation or
physical force with the intent to influence the testimony of a witness in any court
proceeding. 78 Acting with intent to influence a witness’s testimony means to act

71. Davis, supra note 14, at 413 (noting that, in situations in which prosecutors overcharge to
gain leverage, defendants plead guilty out of “fear of being convicted of all of the charges brought
in the indictment,” despite the fact that the prosecutor likely cannot prove these charges at trial).
72. Bibas, supra note 12, at 971 (characterizing this type of overcharging as coercive);
Langer, supra note 26, at 233–41 (same).
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause.”). Once the prosecutor has established probable cause for a charge, courts generally defer
to the prosecutor’s discretion in what charges to bring. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
74. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 970–71; see also Davis, supra note 14, at 413–14 (observing
that prosecutors typically charge offenses that they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial).
75. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at 19 (citing
“government practices,” including threatening and offering favors or benefits to witnesses, as a
cause of wrongful convictions).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (defining the parameters in which a
prosecutor may interact with the defendant and witnesses).
77. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 34–35.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that (1) the witness was scheduled to testify in court, (2) the offender used intimidation or
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for the purpose of persuading the witness to change, color, or shade his testimony
in some way. 79 It is not necessary to prove that the witness’s testimony did, in
fact, change.
D. Suborning Perjury
The most basic form of prosecutorial misconduct is the prosecutor’s use of
perjured testimony—conduct that clearly violates due process. 80 Prosecutors
have the duty to present true testimony, as well as the corresponding duty to
correct false testimony. 81 Thus, a prosecutor commits misconduct not only by
soliciting false testimony, but also by presenting any testimony that he knows to
be false or incorrect, 82 including evidence related solely to the witness’s
credibility. 83 For instance, if a witness falsely denies having received a deal in
exchange for offering testimony, the prosecutor is obligated to report such
perjury.
Despite this duty, reports indicate that many times witnesses are, in fact,
advised to testify falsely. For example, in Napue v. Illinois, the defendant was
convicted of murder primarily based on an accomplice’s testimony, even though
the prosecution was aware that the witness intentionally committed perjury. 84
The accomplice testified that he was not promised anything in return for his
testimony, 85 while, in fact, he was promised a reduced sentence in exchange for
his cooperation. 86
Similarly, in Miller v. Pate, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s
conviction because of the prosecution’s misrepresentations to the jury at trial. 87
The prosecutor repeatedly led the jury to believe that the large stain on the
physical force against the witness, and (3) the offender did so knowingly and willfully, with the
intent to influence the witness’s testimony).
79. Id.
80. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1942) (concluding that the prosecution’s knowing
use of perjured testimony constituted “a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution”); Weiss, supra note 42, at 204–05 (noting that subornation of perjury was the first
form of prosecutorial misconduct to create a deprivation of due process); see also Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (“Safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against
deprivation through the actions of the state embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which
lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.”); Ridolfi & Possley, supra note 1, at 32
(discussing the due process consequences of a prosecutor’s misrepresentation concerning the
presumption of innocence).
81. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The prosecution cannot present evidence it
knows is false and must immediately correct any falsity of which it is aware even if the false
evidence was not intentionally submitted.”).
82. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (reversing and remanding the case because the
prosecutor elicited testimony from a witness that misled the jury).
83. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id. at 270–71.
86. Id. at 265.
87. 386 U.S. 1, 3–4, 6 (1967).
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defendant’s shorts was the victim’s blood. 88 The prosecutor relied on the
emotional impact of the stain on the jury to obtain a death penalty conviction,
despite knowing that most of the stains were actually paint. 89
E. Improper Jury Selection
Jury selection is another process ripe for abuse. The push and pull for the
“right” group of jurors tends to bring out competitive instincts in the advocates
on both sides of the courtroom. 90 The competitive instinct to “win” can often
override any sense of fairness. 91
Challenging prospective jurors for legitimate reasons, such as an obvious
conflict of interest, is far different from excluding jurors for illegitimate reasons,
such as race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. 92 The challenge is
greatest for prosecutors when the defendant belongs to a minority group and the
prosecution is confronted with a prospective juror of the same race, or when a
juror has strong religious convictions that may limit his ability to convict. 93
Using peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the grounds of
bias against an identifiable group of people, based on race, religion, ethnicity, or
similar grounds violates a defendant’s right to equal protection under the
Constitution. 94 Inappropriate peremptory challenges may also violate the
defendant’s right to be tried by a jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community under the relevant state constitution. 95 As set
forth in Batson v. Kentucky, the Constitution “forbids the prosecutor to challenge

88. Id.
89. Id. at 2–4, 6 Similarly, in Brown v. Borg, the prosecutor failed to disclose to the jury that
some of the evidence presented was not actually stolen in the robbery that served as the basis for
the defendant’s felony murder conviction. 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991). The court
considered the prosecutor’s conduct “intolerable” and a perversion of “the adversarial system [that]
endangers its ability to produce just results.” Id.
90. See generally James R. Gadwood, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: Juryquest
in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 291–98 (2008) (describing the different methods of jury
selection).
91. See id. at 318–19 (concluding that both prosecutors and defense attorneys select jurors
using improper methods).
92. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1349–50 (2009).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that exclusion of jurors based
on race can violate the Equal Protection Clause whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror
are the same race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (concluding that choosing jurors
on racial grounds contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment); People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal.
2009) (“Both the [California] and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges
to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity.”); People v. Hamilton,
200 P.3d 898, 929 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging that peremptory strikes based on race violate the
defendant’s rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial).
95. Gadwood, supra note 90, at 318–19. For example, the California Constitution considers
a jury trial “an inviolate right.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that [same
minority] jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case
against a [same minority] defendant.” 96 It is an unfortunate reality that many
prosecutors will attempt to justify their illegitimate challenge by claiming some
neutral reason, though still being motivated by the juror’s race or religion. 97
F. Improper Argument
The prosecution is bound to make only appropriate arguments to the judge or
jury. 98 One form of improper argument is the prosecutor’s endorsement of a
witness’s truthfulness, as it is widely recognized that “the prosecutor’s opinion
carries with it the [weight] of the Government and may induce the jury to trust
the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” 99
Inappropriate strategy also includes testifying on behalf of an absent witness. 100
Similarly, a prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law, offering his
personal opinion, impugning the defense to the jury, or appealing to religious
authorities. 101
G. Introduction of Improper Evidence
The introduction of improper evidence during trial may entail using
impermissible out-of-court statements in an attempt to prove a defendant’s bad
character, 102 or employing tactics to inflame the jury’s prejudice against the
defendant. 103 To bolster his case, a prosecutor may also introduce, or obtain via
witness testimony, inadmissible or prejudicial evidence, even if he knows such
96. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
97. See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 303–10 (2007).
98. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332–34 (1985).
99. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).
100. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 27–28. Testifying for an absent witness denies
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine that witness. Id.
101. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 22–23, 30–31; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5–200 (2013) (prohibiting attorneys from making a false statement of law to mislead
the factfinder); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that a prosecutor’s misstatement
of law could confuse the jury). Such misconduct “tends to diminish the jury’s sense of
responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied.” People v.
Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992); see also Sandoval v. Calderon, 231 F.3d 1140,
1149–52 (9th Cir. 2000) (proscribing the prosecutor’s appeal to religious authority).
102. See, e.g., Good v. State, 723 S.W.2d 734, 735–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In Good, the
prosecutor characterized the defendant’s attitude and character during his testimony as evidence of
guilt. Id. at 735. The court concluded that the “prosecutor focused upon the demeanor appellant
exhibited during the complainant’s testimony, characterizing it as ‘cold, unnerved, uncaring.’” Id.
at 736. The court held that the prosecutor’s argument was improper. Id.
103. See People v. Piper, 162 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding misconduct
because the prosecutor failed to comply with the trial court’s order to refrain from referencing the
defendant’s alcohol use, via the introduction of an exhibit, regardless of whether the reference was
intentional).
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evidence will immediately draw an objection from defense counsel and a
curative instruction from the judge. 104 Prosecutors who engage in this sort of
misconduct are not concerned with the court’s invocation of prophylactic
measures. Rather, the prosecutor’s goal is simply to ensure that the jury hears
the objectionable evidence. Admonished or not, the prosecutor has spoken the
words aloud to the jury, and the damage to the defendant is already done. The
same is true in proceedings in which the judge has already ruled that particular
evidence is inadmissible, but the prosecutor ventures into the forbidden territory
regardless of the ruling. 105 The reasoning is the same; the prosecutor only wants
the jury to hear the evidence, and he knows that the judge likely will not hand
down anything more than a limiting curative instruction, which has a minimal
impact in terms of correcting the misconduct.
For example, even when a prosecutor has stipulated that an informant will not
testify, the prosecutor may deliberately ignore his ethical obligation to abide by
such a stipulation. 106 Likewise, it is improper for a prosecutor to ask
“improperly argumentative” questions that are not designed to elicit helpful
evidence. 107 In fact, a prosecutor is bound to predict, within reason, whether a
witness might engage in misconduct at trial, and to subsequently advise the
witness to control his answers to provide admissible responses. 108 Naturally,
104. Prosecutors cannot knowingly elicit improper evidence by intentionally eliciting
testimony that the trial court previously ruled inadmissible. People v. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d 659, 689
(1988) (finding misconduct because the prosecutor elicited testimony about the defendant’s other
crimes); see also People v. Dagget, 275 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (admonishing
the prosecutor for “unfairly [taking] advantage of the judge’s ruling” by asking the jury to draw an
inference based on evidence that the judge had excluded); People v. Hudson, 179 Cal. Rptr. 95, 96–
100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because of the prosecutor’s repeated
attempts to elicit hearsay and disparaging character evidence).
105. People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 839–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the
prosecutor’s questioning violated the court’s directive regarding evidence of the
codefendant’s prior bad acts); People v. Parsons, 203 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding misconduct because the prosecutor elicited evidence of the criminal defendant’s prior
arrest, even though the prosecutor was aware that the trial court had ruled the evidence
inadmissible).
106. See People v. Bell, 745 P.2d 573, 579 (Cal. 1987) (concluding that a prosecutor acted
improperly because, after stipulating to the court that an informant’s testimony would not be
introduced, he proceeded to read the informant’s statement to the jury by incorporating it into a
question). Similarly, a prosecutor commits misconduct by introducing evidence he promised not
to introduce by agreement between himself and the defendant. See People v. Quartermain, 941
P.2d 788, 798–99 (Cal. 1997) (emphasizing that “when a prosecutor makes a promise that induces
a defendant to waive a constitution protection and act to his or her determinant in reliance on that
promise, the promise must be enforced” and vacating the defendant’s conviction because the
prosecutor introduced the defendant’s incriminating statements after promising that he would not
in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of his right to testify).
107. People v. Johnson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (prohibiting questions
that go “beyond an attempt to elicit facts within the [witness’s] knowledge and [are] instead
designed to engage him in an argument”).
108. People v. Warren, 754 P.2d 218, 224–25 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a prosecutor “has the
duty to guard against statements by his witnesses containing inadmissible evidence”).
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should a witness commence such testimony without any warning, the prosecutor
would not be liable for the inappropriate testimony.
However, what constitutes inappropriate cross-examination of the defendant
remains unclear. The Ninth Circuit, for example, decided that the jury—not the
prosecutor—must evaluate a defendant’s credibility, and therefore it would be
misconduct for a prosecutor to attempt to discredit the defendant at trial. 109
IV. SURVEY OF APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
One commentator recently observed that “[n]o institution or entity has yet
established a system to examine the large percentage of wrongful convictions
due to prosecutorial misconduct and to attempt to make recommendations to
deter such misconduct.” 110 Consequently, one can only guess the number of
cases in which prosecutors’ misconduct results in wrongful convictions. Despite
the absence of a system that can accurately track the percentage of wrongful
convictions, some scholars have noted efforts to investigate and sanction
prosecutorial misconduct. 111 Therefore, it is necessary to examine both past and
present approaches to monitoring prosecutorial behavior before attempting to
offer a solution.
Every state has a bar association that, among other traditional responsibilities,
is responsible for attorney discipline. 112 Each year, over 125,000 complaints are
lodged against the 1.3 million practicing attorneys in the United States. 113
Nearly all of the complaints arise from civil cases. 114 Prosecutor misconduct is
not typically reported to state bar associations, and, even if it is reported, bar
109. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding misconduct
because the prosecutor asked a witness whether another witness was lying, and then endorsed that
witness’s testimony in his closing argument); People v. Zambrano, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 170 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to hold that all argumentative questions are improper because, on
occasion, it is “necessary to clarify a witness’s testimony”). Zambrano can be distinguished
because the prosecutor’s questions were clearly impermissible because they were intended only to
“berate [the] defendant . . . and to force him to call the [police] officers liars in an attempt to inflame
the passions of the jury.” Id.; see also United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that it was erroneous to request a witness to testify to the veracity of another witness’s
statements because this type of credibility determination is the responsibility of the jury); United
States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219–21 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by compelling a witness to give his opinion of another witness’s credibility);
People v. Foster, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535, 539–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing several lines of
“‘were they lying’ questions” cases).
110. Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 285.
111. See, e.g., id. at 286–88 (discussing the ABA’s efforts to establish standardized ethical
guidelines for prosecutors).
112. See Brian K. Pinaire, Milton Heumann & Christian Scarlett, “Philadelphia Lawyers”:
Policing the Law in Pennsylvania, 2012 A.B.A. J. PROF. LAW. 137, 148–49 (2012) (explaining that
many states established bar associations in reaction to an ABA Commission report, known as the
“Clark Report,” that revealed that discipline for attorney misconduct was virtually nonexistent).
113. Id. at 148.
114. Id. (noting that private citizens are largely responsible for these complaints).
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associations generally do not investigate the claims or initiate disciplinary
proceedings. 115
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) Center for Professional
Responsibility has collected and analyzed national data concerning attorney
misconduct. 116 Although the scope of this information is certainly expansive,
the submission of information is purely voluntary and therefore limits the utility
of the analysis. 117 For example, if a particular jurisdiction does not maintain the
category of data requested (or should a jurisdiction not engage in certain
activities), the Commission can only estimate the relevant data in an effort to
render an integrated and meaningful statistical analysis. 118 The Commission
publishes its results in the ABA Survey on Lawyer Disciplinary Systems (SOLD),
which details the scope of each jurisdiction’s disciplinary enforcement policies,
caseload tally, and budgetary information. 119
The state bar association model has little impact on prosecutors, partly
because of the type of complaint that triggers a bar association inquiry. Civil
complaints generally focus on financial matters, such as complaints over fees or
commingling of assets, which bar associations are equipped to address. 120
Conversely, victims of prosecutorial misconduct typically report misconduct
directly to the trial or appellate court hearing their cases because no state has
established a disciplinary system to specifically address alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. 121
With rare exceptions, it is left to supervisors in prosecutors’ offices to
investigate and, if appropriate, sanction errant prosecutors. 122 However, internal
investigations are suboptimal. 123 For example, one study of the efficacy of
115. Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, States Can Discipline Federal Prosecutors, Rarely Do,
U.S.A. TODAY (Dec. 8, 2010, 11:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington
/judicial/2010-12-09-RW_prosecutorbar09_ST_N.htm.
116. STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2009 SURVEY ON LAWYER
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2010) [hereinafter 2009 SOLD REPORT], available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/2009sold.authcheckdam.pdf.
117. See 2009 ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/survey_lawyer_discipli
ne_systems_2009.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
118. Id.
119. Id. Other categories include lawyer population, case-processing statistics, sanctions
imposed, and disciplinary counsel, among other categories. Id.
120. See 2009 SOLD REPORT, supra note 116, at 3 (reporting that 857 attorneys in New York’s
First Judicial Department were suspended for failing to pay registration fees).
121. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 285 (“No institution has yet established a system to
examine the large percentage of wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct and to
attempt to make recommendations to deter such misconduct.”).
122. See Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors will be Disciplined
by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2011) (emphasizing prosecutors’ offices’ inability to effectively sanction and
deter misconduct).
123. Id. at 542.
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internal investigation found that, of 381 cases in which convictions were
overturned because the prosecutor concealed or falsified evidence, only three
prosecutors were minimally reprimanded and no prosecutor was disbarred or
publicly sanctioned. 124
Prosecutorial misconduct is particularly prevalent in California, Illinois, and
New York. 125 California’s Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice
studied 2,131 cases in which allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were
raised. 126 Appellate courts found prosecutorial misconduct in 444 of these
cases, overturning fifty-four. 127 Although California law requires allegations of
misconduct to be reported to, and investigated by, the state bar association, the
study revealed that none of the fifty-four overturned cases was referred to the
bar association. 128
Perhaps recognizing that their attorneys lack meaningful oversight, some
states have taken additional steps to restructure their attorney disciplinary
schemes. Some states collaborate with their bar associations, while others have
created committees, independent of their state bars, that are under the direct
supervision of the states’ highest courts. 129 A number of states have instituted
disciplinary schemes independent of the traditional bar association model. 130
However, because these schemes still address both civil and criminal matters,
meaningful oversight and discipline of prosecutors continues to be elusive.
A. Colorado
In January 1999, Colorado established a new Attorney Regulation Counsel,
which investigates attorney misconduct and recommends sanctions to the state’s
124. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11,
1999, at C1.
125. See id. (revealing that New York and Illinois ranked highest for reversals attributed to
prosecutorial misconduct); Savage, supra note 49 (reporting that California, especially Los Angeles
County, follows just behind Illinois in the greatest number of exonerations attributable to
prosecutorial misconduct).
126. CAL. COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (Gerald Uelmen &
Chris Boscia eds., 2008) [hereinafter CAL. FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.ccfaj.
org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. An independent study revealed that about half of the states have created disciplinary
systems under the direct supervision of the state’s highest court. These states include Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See generally AM. BAR
ASS’N, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES 2012-13 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/directory
_of_lawyer_disciplinary_agencies.authcheckdam.pdf.
130. Jennifer M. Kraus, Attorney Discipline Systems: Improving Public Perception and
Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 273, 278–82 (2000) (discussing the disciplinary schemes
in Colorado, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, California, Montana, Pennsylvania, and New York).
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Regulation Committee. 131 The Counsel reviews all attorney grievances, not just
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 132 The Counsel adjudicates formal
charges by three-member panels comprised of one sitting judge and two
members appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court from a pool of lawyers and
members of the public. 133 Since the implementation of the new scheme, more
than two hundred attorneys have been investigated and prosecuted. 134 Between
March and September of 2012, twenty-nine Colorado attorneys who engaged in
misconduct were sanctioned, including private and public admonition and
suspensions. 135 However, none of these attorneys were prosecutors. 136
Moreover, although Colorado also created a separate council within the district
attorney’s office to “promote, foster, and encourage an effective administration
of criminal justice,” the council is not responsible for disciplinary measures. 137
B. Minnesota
Like Colorado, Minnesota abandoned the state bar model and instituted a
disciplinary system with several components that execute different disciplinary
functions. 138 Minnesota’s Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB),
which is comprised of twenty-three members appointed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, oversees attorney discipline. 139 The Board is divided into
several three-member panels that preside over hearings to determine whether
there is probable cause for public discipline. 140 In 2008, the Supreme Court
131. Id. at 280. The Regulation Committee is responsible for screening and investigating
complaints. Id. The Committee is comprised of six attorneys and three members of the public. Id.
132. See id. (making no distinction between civil and criminal attorneys); Colorado Supreme
Court – Attorney Regulation Counsel, COLO. SUP. CT., http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com
/Regulation/Regulation.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (same).
133. Kraus, supra note 130, at 280; see also Press Release, Colo. Judicial Branch, Colo.
Supreme Court Selects William R. Lucero as Presiding Disciplinary Judge (Feb. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Press_Releases.cfm?year=2004 (select “Feb 04”
tab and click on the corresponding link).
134. Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, COLO. SUP. CT., http://www.colorado
supremecourt.com/PDJ/pdj.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). Opinions and reports released on this
website indicate 232 opinions, many of which imposed sanctions. Id.
135. Id. An independent search of all of the posted opinions indicated that twenty-nine cases
resulted in sanctions.
136. Id.
137. About CDAC, COLO. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S COUNCIL, http://www.cda
cweb.com/CDAC/AboutCDAC.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). The Council provides services
for effective prosecution, including training, legal research, and management assistance. Id.
138. About the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, MINN. OFF. LAWS. PROF. RESP.,
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
139. Id. The Board is comprised of fourteen lawyer members and nine non-lawyer members.
Id.
140. Id. More than 327 lawyers and non-lawyers dedicate their time to investigating
complaints and provide recommendations based on their expertise of appropriate disciplinary
actions for the board to consider. Kent Gernander & Charles Lundberg, What Works Well and Why,
BENCH & BAR (Feb. 2006), http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/feb06/prof_response.htm.
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Advisory Committee concluded that Minnesota’s disciplinary system was
“‘healthy’ and working well.” 141 In 2011, the LPRB received 1,337 complaints
alleging misconduct. 142 Twenty-six attorneys were publicly disciplined, but
only two attorneys were disbarred, on the basis of dishonesty and
misappropriation and disciplinary history. 143 None of the disciplined attorneys
were prosecutors. 144
C. Indiana
Indiana has also shifted disciplinary authority from the state bar association
to the judicial branch. 145 However, once again, the investigative and
disciplinary functions do not distinguish between civil and criminal attorneys,
or between prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. 146 In 2011, the Indiana
Judicial Branch Disciplinary Commission filed sixty-three verified complaints
of attorney misconduct with the Indiana Supreme Court, including at least one
against a prosecuting attorney. 147 However, that prosecutor received a 120-day
suspension for his actions as a private practitioner, not for prosecutorial
misconduct. 148
D. Montana
On July 1, 2002, the Montana Supreme Court also created an attorney
regulation system independent of the state bar association. 149 Like its

141. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE LAWYER
DISCIPLINE SYSTEM 11 (2008), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Supreme
%20Court%20Advisory%20Report/Supreme%20Court%20Advisory%20Commitee%20Report.p
df (characterizing district ethics committees as vital and urging continuation of the system). In
2011, the Director’s Office implemented eighty-two percent of the District Ethics Committees
recommendations. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD
24 (2012), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Documents/2012%20Annual%20
Report.pdf.
142. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD, supra note
141, at 2 (noting that this was a slight decrease from 2010, in which 1,365 complaints were filed).
143. Id. at 4.
144. See id. at A7.
145. See Donald R. Lundberg, Two Case Studies in the Exercise of Discretion in Lawyer
Discipline Systems, 2009 A.B.A. J. PROF. LAW. 107, 107 n.2, 108 (2009) (describing Indiana’s
attorney discipline system).
146. See id. at 113–20 (describing Indiana’s discipline scheme with regard to attorneys in
general, not solely prosecutors).
147. INDIANA SUPREME COURT, 2010–2011 ANNUAL REPORT 37–39 (2011), available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/files/1011report.pdf.
148. Id. The sanctioned attorney negotiated a contract to bring civil forfeiture suits against
criminal defendants’ property as a private practitioner. Id.
149. OFF. OF DISCIPLINARY COUNS. FOR THE ST. OF MONT., ODC’S 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1
(2012), available at http://montanaodc.org/Portals/ODC/2011%20Annual%20Report.pdf. Before
July 1, 2002, the State Bar Association was the primary attorney disciplinary regime in Montana.
Id. at 16. The state restructured its disciplinary regime to include the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
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counterparts in other states, the Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel also
addresses the misconduct of both civil and criminal attorneys. 150 In 2011, only
six percent of the complaints filed alleged misconduct by prosecuting attorneys,
none of whom were sanctioned publicly. 151
E. West Virginia
In a few states, special prosecutors are appointed by court order in situations
in which the previously assigned prosecutor is unfit to continue. 152 In West
Virginia, judges are responsible for the investigation and discipline of
prosecutors in their courtrooms. 153 Specifically, judges have the authority to
remove prosecutors and to appoint special prosecutors if misconduct occurs. 154
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court is generally reluctant to exercise
this authority and has limited the scope of its power to the disqualification of
prosecutors with conflicts of interest. 155 Additionally, the court has established
constitutional protections for the accused attorney, which require notice and an
opportunity for a hearing before the court can disqualify him and appoint a
special prosecutor to continue the case. 156

and the Commission on Practice under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Montana. Id. In
2011, reports indicated that, between 1992 and 2002, there were approximately fifty-eight public
disciplinary orders against Montana lawyers. Id. at 8. However, from 2003 to 2011, reports
indicated 144 public disciplinary rulings, an increase since the new regime was enacted. Id.
150. Id. at 1–3 (failing to differentiate between criminal and civil attorneys). From 2007 to
2011, over fifty percent of complainants were current or former clients alleging misconduct on
behalf of their retained attorneys. Id. at 12. Only an average of two percent of complaints were
received from the courts. Id.
151. Id. at 13.
152. See Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the
Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 145–46 (2007). The appointment of a special prosecutor is
not limited to disqualifications based on misconduct. See id. at 146. For example, in North
Carolina, the Special Prosecution Division was not enacted to investigate and discipline
misconduct, but rather to expedite trials and provide trial assistance and resources for complex
issues. Id. This discussion of special prosecutors is limited to those states that use special
prosecutors to tackle prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 7-7-8 (LexisNexis 2010) (vesting the power to appoint a special prosecutor in judicial officials),
with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (West 2011) (vesting the power to appoint a special prosecutor in
the attorney general), and Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 1007 (N.Y. 1997) (concluding
that supersession was appropriate in a death penalty case in which the prosecutor threatened the
“faithful execution of the death penalty law”).
153. W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (“If, in any case, the prosecuting attorney and his assistants are
unable to act, or if in the opinion of the court it would be improper for him or his assistants to act,
the court shall appoint some competent practicing attorney to act in that case.”).
154. Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 152, at 149–50 (citing West Virginia as an example of a
state that vests the power to appoint special prosecutors in the state judiciary).
155. Dennis, supra note 152, at 15 (indicating that a conflict of interest arises only if “the
prosecutor has a direct personal interest in the proceeding”).
156. Dennis, supra note 152, at 150; see Ex rel. Brown v. Merrifield, 389 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W.
Va. 1990) (explaining that the judge acted outside of the scope of his authority under
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F. New York
New York has addressed attorney misconduct by creating several grievance
committees that are responsible for investigating reported misconduct and
disciplining offending attorneys. 157 Despite these general efforts to reduce
misconduct, New York has failed to address prosecutorial misconduct
specifically. 158 The state generally delegates the oversight of prosecutors to
individual district attorneys’ offices. 159 However, these offices continually fail
to report misconduct to the proper disciplinary authority and to discipline their
prosecutors for discovered misconduct. 160 According to a study conducted by
the New York State Bar Association’s Task Force on Wrongful Conviction, 161
of fifty-three cases that resulted in a wrongful conviction, no public disciplinary
steps were taken against the prosecutors, only one prosecutor was referred to a
disciplinary committee, and only one prosecutor was sanctioned internally. 162
G. Illinois
Illinois imposes statutory requirements on legal professionals to report certain
instances of attorney misconduct. 163 Attorneys who breach their duty to report
are subject to suspension. 164 In 1999, an elaborate study by the Chicago Tribune
of the fifty-nine attorney disciplinary agencies nationwide revealed that Illinois
was second only to New York in the number of wrongful convictions attributed
§ 7-7-8 because he appointed a special prosecutor without providing the former prosecutor with
notice or the opportunity for a hearing).
157. Attorney Grievance Committees: Complaints About Attorneys, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED
COURT SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/attorneygrievance/complaints.shtml (last visited Jan. 24,
2014); Rudin, supra note 122, at 547 (noting that the grievance committees are tasked with
investigating and disciplining misconduct and may initiate investigations without a formal
complaint). The appropriate grievance office with which to file a complaint alleging misconduct
depends on the location of the lawyer’s office. Attorney Grievance Committees, supra.
158. Rudin, supra note 122, at 541–42. According to the New York State Bar Association
Task Force on Wrongful Convictions, no public disciplinary action had been taken against
prosecutors. Id.
159. Id. at 541.
160. Id. at 541–42 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at
29) (“‘[T]here is little to no risk to the specific [prosecutor] involved resulting form a failure to
follow the [Brady] rule.’”).
161. FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at 29. The Task Force
surveyed district attorneys’ offices across New York, inquiring whether the office had ever imposed
sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. Id. Twenty offices responded to the questionnaire, and
one office declined to respond because of pending litigation. Id.
162. See Rudin, supra note 122, at 541–42. The study revealed that thirty-one of the
fifty-three cases were overturned for, at least in part, “governmental practices,” defined to include
the use of false testimony by prosecutors, Brady violations, improper handling of evidence, and
failure to investigate alternative suspects. Id. at 541.
163. ILL. S. CT. R. P. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation . . . shall inform the appropriate authority.”).
164. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795–96 (suspending an attorney for one year for
failing to report misconduct).
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to prosecutorial misconduct. 165 The five-part article revealed a thirty-six-year
history of misconduct and an ongoing lack of oversight of Illinois prosecutors. 166
Illinois tried forty-six of the 381 overturned homicide convictions the article
examined—twice as many convictions overturned by the third-ranked state. 167
At least a dozen of the prosecutors involved in these cases underwent additional
investigation, but none were publicly censured or disbarred. 168
In 2002, to better address misconduct, Illinois enacted a “duty to report”
provision that requires attorneys to report certain known misconduct by fellow
attorneys to the Illinois Disciplinary Commission. 169 Since the provision’s
enactment, judges and attorneys have filed over 5,000 reports of alleged attorney
misconduct. 170 Seven hundred and twenty five of those reports alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. 171 However, only a handful have been investigated.
165. Possley & Armstrong, supra note 124.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. One prosecutor was fired, but was later reinstated with back pay. Id. One prosecutor
received a thirty-day, in-house suspension. Id. Two prosecutors were criminally indicted, but the
charges were dropped before trial. Id. The final prosecutor was suspended for fifty-nine days, as
a consequence of additional instances of misconduct unrelated to the wrongful conviction. Id.
169. ILL. S. CT. R. P. 8.3.
170. ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2012
ANNUAL REPORT 27 Chart 25 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2012.pdf (reporting 5,193 attorney reports filed from 2003 to
2012).
171. See id. at 13 Chart 9 (seventy-one allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y
REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT 17 Chart 9 (2012), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2011.pdf (sixty-four
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 17 Chart 9 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT], available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2010.pdf (ninety-nine allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILL., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 16 Chart 9 (2010), available at
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2009.pdf (seventy-five allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL.,
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 9 Chart 9 (2009), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport
2008.pdf (sixty-five allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 11 Chart 9 (2008)
[hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT], available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport
2007.pdf (sixty-four allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 7 Chart 2 (2007),
available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2006.pdf (fifty-one allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL.,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 6 Chart 2 (2006), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport
2005.pdf (forty-seven allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 6 Chart 2 (2005),
available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2004.pdf (sixty-nine allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL.,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT 7 Chart 2 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2003.pdf (fifty-three allegations of prosecutorial misconduct);
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Annual reports indicate that only three prosecutors have been sanctioned and
only one prosecutor has been suspended for misconduct. 172
H. Texas
Although a few states have ventured from the mainstream, only Texas and the
Federal Department of Justice have implemented separate disciplinary schemes
for prosecutors. 173 In 1977, Texas created the Texas Prosecutor Council, which
was responsible for regulating prosecutorial conduct. 174 Although this
committee was created primarily to assist and educate Texas prosecutors, it also
accepted claims of misconduct and instituted a procedure for addressing
complaints. 175 The Council was composed of a combination of lay citizens and
prosecuting attorneys. 176 Any member of the public could file a complaint
alleging prosecutorial misconduct with the Council. 177 Upon receipt of a
complaint, the Council would conduct an investigation into the allegation of
misconduct. 178 The Council had the authority to privately reprimand the
attorney, hold a hearing before the Council, or hold a formal hearing before a

ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT
6
Chart
2
(2003),
available
at
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport
2002.pdf (sixty-seven allegations of prosecutorial misconduct).
172. See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 170, at 25 Chart 23 (one prosecutor censured for
misconduct); 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 28 Chart 23 (one prosecutor suspended for
misconduct); 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 20 Chart 23 (two prosecutors censured for
“failure to disclose exculpatory evidence”); 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 14 Chart 14
(one prosecutor censured for misconduct).
173. Texas is the only state to establish a committee solely devoted to state prosecutors. Steele,
supra note 21, at 983 n.119 (conducting an informal survey of state disciplinary systems and
concluding that no state had established a centralized agency comparable to the Texas agency); see
infra text and accompanying notes 191, 197–200 (discussing the establishment of the DOJ’s
Professional Misconduct Review Unit). An independent search through Westlaw and the
nationwide listed disciplinary agencies confirms Steele’s findings.
174. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d (West 1984) (repealed 1985). In 1977, the
Sixty-Fifth Texas Legislature created the Texas Prosecutors Coordinating Council, which was
designed to be an agency solely responsible for the conduct of Texas prosecutors. See S.B. 113,
65th Leg. (Tex. 1977). In 1981, the Sixty-Seventh Legislature renamed the body the “Texas
Prosecutor Council.” Texas Prosecutor Council, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/tslac/10174/10174-P.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). The Council
did not expressly proscribe certain conduct, but rather accepted complaints and investigated
instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d § 8(4).
175. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d, § 8.
176. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 3(a) (requiring the council to be comprised of “four
citizens of the State of Texas, who are not licensed to practice law, appointed by the Governor of
Texas, with the advice and consent of the senate” and “five incumbent, elected prosecuting
attorneys to be elected by prosecuting attorneys, at least one of each of whom shall be a county
attorney, a district attorney, and a criminal district attorney”).
177. See TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 8(4) (failing to define who can file charges).
178. See id.
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specially appointed master. 179 The Council was responsible for operations
related to Texas prosecutors until 1986, when budget cuts resulted in
restructuring and prosecutorial oversight was once again delegated to the Texas
State Bar. 180 Unfortunately, Texas’s annual reports do not include sanctions or
results of formal hearings.
The State Bar of Texas has reported that only three prosecutors have been
reprimanded for misconduct after the abolishment of the Prosecutor’s
Council. 181 However, the Texas Tribune discovered that prosecutorial
misconduct contributed to a wrongful conviction in nearly a quarter of the
eighty-six convictions overturned between 1989 and 2011. 182 At least one Texas
scholar attributes this high level of misconduct to the lack of oversight of
prosecutors. 183 The Texas Tribune’s investigation further revealed that no
prosecutor involved with the eighty-six improperly prosecuted cases was
disciplined in any form. 184
I. Federal Government
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has also grappled with the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct. As early as 1994, Congress recognized the
need for an independent committee to review the actions of federal prosecutors,
and it considered adding a provision to the Independent Counsel Reauthorization
Act to require the Attorney General to appoint independent counsel to

179. See TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 10(g)(1) (“After investigation of a complaint of
prosecutor incompetency or misconduct, the council may, in its discretion, issue a private
reprimand, order a hearing to be held before the council, or request the supreme court to appoint a
master to hold a hearing.”). If the council considered a formal hearing necessary, it was required
to notify the prosecutor of the complaint against him and the date of the hearing. TEXAS CONST.
& CIV. STAT. § 10(h). In a formal hearing, evidence and witnesses were to be presented in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 10(g).
180. See Texas Prosecutor Council, supra note 174. In 1984, the Texas Sunset Advisory
Commission reviewed the Prosecutor Council and decided to transfer the Council’s responsibilities
to other state agencies in efforts to save costs. Id. On September 1, 1985, the agency was abolished
and its responsibilities were delegated to the State Bar of Texas, Office of Attorney General, and
Texas Judicial Council. Id.
181. Brandi Grissom, Courts Found DA Error in Nearly 25% of Reversed Cases, TEX. TRIB.,
July 5, 2012, http://www.texastribune.org/2012/07/05/courts-found-prosecutors-erred-25
-exonerations/ (noting that none of the three sanctioned prosecutors were involved in the eighty-six
convictions overturned between 1989 and 2011).
182. Id. (identifying twenty-one cases in which prosecutorial misconduct contributed to a
wrongful conviction). The prosecutors in these cases “broke basic legal and ethical rules” by
suppressing evidence and testimony and making improper statements to the jury. Id. In seventeen
of the twenty-one cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence from the defense. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Jennifer Laurin, a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, who
stated that there is “next to no oversight” of prosecutors).
184. Id. (noting that the Texas State Bar “reports very little public discipline of prosecutors in
recent history”).
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investigate claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 185 However, the Act as passed
did not include this provision. 186
Likewise, the Citizens Protection Act of 1998, as enacted, omitted a review
board for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 187 As originally drafted, the Act
included a Misconduct Review Board that was responsible for reviewing the
Attorney General’s decisions regarding complaints of prosecutorial
misconduct. 188 The proposal invited the public to lodge complaints with the
Attorney General against any Justice Department attorney who engaged in
specified forms of misconduct. 189 If the Attorney General found misconduct, he
would either impose the appropriate sanction or, if criminal prosecution was
necessary, refer the matter to the grand jury. 190
In 2011, the DOJ established the Professional Misconduct Review Unit
(PMRU), an internal unit designed to impose swift and consistent sanctions for
prosecutorial misconduct. 191 Before the PMRU, DOJ supervisors were
responsible for punishing attorneys for misconduct identified and investigated
by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). 192 The OPR investigated
alleged misconduct and reported its results and recommendations for
punishment to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the appropriate
component head, and the attorney’s supervisor determined the appropriate

185. Morton, supra note 14, at 1113 (noting concern for the growing number of cases of
misconduct, corruption, and fraud).
186. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 594 et seq. (2006)) (failing to include a provision addressing prosecutorial
misconduct).
187. Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-119 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006)) (failing to include a prosecutorial misconduct review board).
188. Citizens Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. § 203.
189. H.R. 3396, § 202. The original version of the Citizens Protection Act made it punishable
conduct to:
(1) in the absence of probable cause seek the indictment of any person; (2) fail promptly
to release information that would exonerate a person under indictment; (3) intentionally
mislead a court as to the guilt of any person; (4) intentionally or knowingly misstate
evidence; (5) intentionally or knowingly alter evidence; (6) attempt to influence or color
a witness’s testimony; (7) act to frustrate or impede a defendant’s right to discovery; (8)
offer or provide sexual activities to any government witness or potential witness; (9) leak
or otherwise improperly disseminate information to any person during an investigation;
or (10) engage in conduct that discredits the Department.
H.R. 3396, § 201(a).
190. See H.R. 3396, § 201(b) (listing the penalties available to the attorney general); H.R. 3396,
§ 201(b)(7) (instructing the attorney general to refer allegations to the grand jury).
191. Memorandum from the Attorney General, to H. Marshall Jarrett, Dir., Exec. Office for
U.S. Att’ys et al. (Jan. 14., 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/pmru
-creation.pdf.
192. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT
2011, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011], available at http://www.justice
.gov/opr/annualreport2011.pdf.
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sanction. 193 If a disagreement arose between the OPR Counsel and the
prosecutor’s supervisor concerning the investigation or the disciplinary
recommendation, the supervisor could submit a request to depart from the report
to an Associate Deputy Attorney General (ADAG), who would determine
whether the supervisor could deviate from the OPR’s recommendation. 194 If the
prosecutor had simply exercised poor judgment, the OPR would defer to the
attorney’s supervisor. 195 The involvement of department supervisors, ADAGs,
and the OPR, for which discipline was just one responsibility among many,
resulted in delays and inconsistencies in punishment. 196
By contrast, the DOJ’s current approach shifts the adjudicatory function from
the attorneys’ supervisors to the PMRU. The sole function of the PMRU is to
discipline professional misconduct. 197 If OPR finds in its initial investigation
that a prosecutor has engaged in intentional or reckless conduct, it refers the
matter to the PMRU to discipline the attorney in a timely, fair, and consistent
manner. 198 The PMRU may determine the appropriate sanction from a range of
specified discipline recommendations, but it is not required to adhere to the
OPR’s recommendation. 199 PMRU officials may act outside of the OPR’s
recommended range of punishment, provided that it notifies the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General before implementing discretionary action. 200
In 2011, the OPR received 1,381 complaints alleging attorney misconduct.201
OPR opened investigations for twenty of these cases and flagged an additional

193. Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 191 (noting that, if OPR found
misconduct, it would recommend a range of possible sanctions). A component head was the Office
of the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General, the Director of EOUSA, or any
other appropriate component head. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (explaining that OPR would return the matter to the attorney’s supervisor “for any
appropriate action”).
196. Id.
197. Id. (“The creation of a PMRU exclusively dedicated to the resolution of disciplinary
matters arising out of findings of professional misconduct within established time limitations will
not only reduce delays but also permit consistent resolution of matters involving similarly situated
employees.”).
198. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192 (explaining that the OPR refers cases
involving intentional or reckless misconduct to the PMRU for determination of punishment); see
Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 191 (emphasizing the PMRU’s deadlines and
the importance of its compliance with those deadlines).
199. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192 (noting that the OPR’s recommendation is
not binding on the PMRU).
200. Id.
201. Id. Of these 1,381 complaints, 720 (fifty-two percent) were filed by incarcerated persons.
Id. Additionally, some complaints were not matters within the jurisdiction of the OPR and were
referred to the appropriate agency. Id.

80

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:51

149 for further review. 202 OPR found misconduct in eleven of these cases. 203
At the close of 2011, two federal attorneys had been disciplined and six attorneys
had a disciplinary action pending against them. 204 Of the two attorneys
disciplined, one received a written reprimand and the other was suspended. 205
Two of the six attorneys awaiting disciplinary action were alleged to have
committed reckless professional misconduct during the prosecution of Senator
Ted Stevens. 206 Ultimately, the OPR found that the two prosecutors failed to
provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, which caused the PMRU to
suspend them. 207
While shifting the initial investigation from a supervisor—who has a
relationship with the prosecutor—to a more detached committee is more likely
to ensure an objective investigation, the DOJ scheme is still entirely internal,
202. Id. at 5. Of the 149 cases flagged for further review, fifty were obtained through judicial
opinions and referrals by department employees of judicial criticism, twenty-one were filed by
private attorneys, forty-five were referrals from department components unrelated to judicial
findings, twenty were complaints filed by private individuals, five were allegations from other
agencies, and eight complaints issued from other sources. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note
192, at 8 tbl.1. The most common types of complaint alleged Brady violations, Giglio violations,
and discovery violations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. OPR ANNUAL REPORT
2011, supra note 192, at 2.
203. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192, at 14 (reporting that, of the eleven
misconduct findings, four involved intentional professional misconduct by a departmental attorney,
and nine involved reckless disregard for an applicable obligation). The 2011 statistics were
comparable to past years. Compare id. (finding professional misconduct in eleven of the 169 cases
opened as inquiries or investigations in 2011), with OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 5, 9 (2011), available at
OF
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2010.pdf
(finding
professional
misconduct
in
twenty-four of the 183 cases opened as inquiries or investigations in 2010), and OFFICE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 6, 9 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2009.pdf (finding professional misconduct in twelve of the
245 cases opened as inquires or investigations in 2009).
204. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192, at 15–16. Disciplinary action was ordered
for one of the eleven attorneys, but he resigned before it could be implemented. Id. at 15.
Additionally, disciplinary action was not initiated against two attorneys because they were no
longer employees of the department. Id. at 16.
205. Id. at 16.
206. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS
671–72 (2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/052412-081511
Report.pdf.
207. Elizabeth Murphy, OPR Report Finds “Reckless” Misconduct by AUSAs in Botched
Stevens Case, MAIN JUSTICE (May 24, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com
/2012/05/24/opr-report-finds-reckless-misconduct-by-ausas-in-botched-stevens-case/.
AUSA
Joseph Bottini was suspended for forty days without pay, and AUSA James Goeke was suspended
for fifteen days without pay. Id.; see also Matthew Volkov, Ted Stevens Case Prosecutors Appeal
Disciplinary Action, MAIN JUSTICE (June 27, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.main
justice.com/2012/06/27/ted-stevens-case-prosecutors-appeal-disciplinary-action/ (reporting that
AUSAs Bottini and Goeke appealed PMRU’s disciplinary action and sought review from the U.S.
Merit System Protection Board).
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with DOJ personnel investigating other DOJ personnel. This provides anything
but a reliable mechanism for scrutinizing prosecutorial misconduct.
V. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT PRACTICES
A. Ineffectiveness of Reporting Requirements
Conduct unreported is conduct left unremedied. Even though trial courts,
appellate courts, and defense attorneys are in the best position to recognize
prosecutorial misconduct and are ethically obligated to report such misconduct,
this rarely happens in practice. 208 Current ethical guidelines obligate judges to
report suspected misconduct. The American Bar Association Standing
Commission on Professional Discipline’s Judicial Response to Lawyer
Misconduct instructs that “[o]nce a reviewing court has found a prosecutor’s
actions to be misconduct in the form of a disciplinary rule violation, whether or
not reversal or dismissal is warranted, the court should report the conduct to the
appropriate disciplinary authorities.” 209 Similarly, the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct . . . should take appropriate action. A judge having
knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct . . . that raises a substantial question as to the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects shall inform the appropriate authority. 210
Other attorneys—particularly defense attorneys—are also in an optimal
position to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct and are similarly obligated
to report observed misconduct to the appropriate authority. 211 The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct require an attorney to report misconduct if he “knows
that another lawyer has committed a violation . . . that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.” 212 However,
defense attorneys are typically reluctant to report prosecutorial misconduct. 213
208. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–29
(2008) (“[J]udges [and legislators] have never answered the calls for external regulation of the
prosecutor’s office, and the political dynamics of American criminal justice make it very unlikely
that they will do so in the future.”).
209. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 436 & n.172 (quoting STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L
DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT § I.12 (1984)).
210. Id. at 436 n.172 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (1990)).
211. Attorneys are obligated to report misconduct on the part of both other attorneys and
judges. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a)–(b) (2013).
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a).
213. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 428–29, 433 (“[I]t is an empirical fact that very few defense
attorneys report prosecutors who commit misconduct to the state bar or any other disciplinary
authority.”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2009) (discussing a study of Boston
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Criminal defendants also have the opportunity to report prosecutorial
misconduct. However, unlike the reports made by judges and defense attorneys,
complaints made by defendants are generally unsuccessful because the
defendant is seen as too self-interested or is unable to correctly distinguish
between misconduct and zealous advocacy because of his inadequate knowledge
of the criminal justice system. 214 Furthermore, most defendants are
understandably too focused on their attorneys’ ability to protect their interests,
leaving little room to worry about reporting possible prosecutorial
misconduct. 215
Why the reticence by judges and defense counsel to report misconduct?
Because prosecutors wield significant power and influence over local criminal
justice communities, both judges and defense counsel are often concerned about
the possible backlash that a report of misconduct might generate. 216 In certain
situations, prosecutors have the power to challenge a judge’s ability to sit on
criminal cases, and, in some states, can even remove a judge from hearing any
criminal cases. 217 Moreover, judges are often hesitant to sully prosecutors’
careers and reputations. 218 Finally, it is commonly believed that judges can and
should remediate problems in their courtrooms without resorting to outside
authorities. 219
Defense attorneys are similarly vulnerable to the repercussions that may result
from reporting prosecutorial misconduct. A defense attorney who acquires a
reputation for “turning in” local prosecutors may find himself ostracized or
marginalized from the local criminal justice community. 220 This type of
consequence may limit an attorney’s effectiveness in the plea negotiation
process, which resolves ninety-five percent of cases. 221 This negative impact
upon an attorney’s ability to represent his clients successfully would, in turn,
affect the attorney’s ability to obtain new clients.

attorneys that found “that only 6.3% of lawyers would report their colleagues to the bar were they
aware of a flagrant violation of an ethical canon, which, if discovered, might result in criminal
liability”).
214. Steele, supra note 21, at 979–80.
215. Id. at 980.
216. See Gershowitz, supra note 213, at 1086 (arguing that the failure to report misconduct
often results from ignorance of ethics rules, fear of retaliation or being considered a “snitch,” and
the absence of meaningful sanctions for violating the rules).
217. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REV. 629, 693 (1972) (describing jurisdictions in which litigants can move to disqualify a
judge for no specific reason, similar to a peremptory challenge in the jury-selection process).
218. Gershowitz, supra note 213, at 1086–87 (noting judges’ reluctance to report prosecutorial
misconduct, which may stem in part from sympathy for the prosecutor and his career).
219. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1098.
220. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 425–26 (describing the difficulties a defense attorney might
face if he develops a reputation for reporting misconduct).
221. Id. at 437.
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Additionally, there also exists the belief that reporting prosecutorial
misconduct is futile in the absence of a viable disciplinary body empowered to
investigate or discipline the offenders. 222 Indeed, no state has established an
effective mechanism designed solely to investigate and discipline prosecutorial
misconduct. 223 Given the inadequacies of current methodologies and the
significant drawbacks to reporting, it comes as no surprise that those in a position
to see so much report so little.
B. The Inadequacies of Trial Court and Appellate Court Remedies
Although current attorney discipline practices are largely ineffective, there are
instances in which prosecutorial misconduct is identified and remedied at the
trial level. For example, trial judges frequently resolve problems that arise from
discovery-related misconduct. 224 Indeed, the trial court has the option to
exclude evidence affected by misconduct, a remedy that is most appropriate in
cases in which the prosecutor fails to provide discovery in a timely fashion. 225
Still, while the option of excluding evidence exists, most trial courts are reticent
to employ such a measure. 226 Out of concern for the government’s case, many
judges simply continue the trial to give defense counsel adequate time to react
to tardy disclosures. Although this approach maintains the integrity of the state’s
case, it typically will not result in the sanctioning of the offending prosecutor. 227
The trial judge may choose to give the offending prosecutor a verbal reprimand,
but typically there are no further repercussions. 228 There is, therefore, little
incentive for offending prosecutors to refrain from future misconduct.

222. See id. at 437–38 (observing that the lack of real consequences for misconduct is a
practical justification for failing to report misconduct).
223. See supra note 174 (describing two independent searches for jurisdictions that have
established a body to investigate and discipline prosecutorial misconduct).
224. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (explaining that it is the
responsibility of the trial court to rule on the admissibility of evidence).
225. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1967); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 265, 272 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957).
226. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 36–37. Brady violations are the “most pernicious”
form of misconduct because they prevent “the jury from considering proper and admissible
evidence supporting the innocence of the defendant.” Id. at 36.
227. See Smith v. Phillip, 455 U.S. 209, 220 (1982) (concluding that there was no proof of
actual bias or prejudice to the defendant despite the existence of prosecutorial misconduct). In
Smith, Justice Rehnquist noted that overlooking the misconduct was appropriate because the
“touchstone of due process analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”
Id. at 219.
228. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1102–03 (explaining that the harmless error doctrine
ensures that the prosecutor will not be subject to suppression or exclusion because of his
misconduct); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (admonishing the prosecutor
but holding that the misconduct was harmless).
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It must be acknowledged that prosecutorial misconduct rarely results in
conviction reversals. 229 Accepting the reality that successful appeals of criminal
convictions, regardless of the issues, are unlikely, alleging prosecutorial
misbehavior as the basis for reversal is a daunting task. 230 The harmless error
standard adds an additional hurdle by providing great leeway for appellate courts
to uphold convictions, even in light of trial irregularities such as prosecutorial
misconduct. 231 Appellate courts often recognize prosecutorial error, but
invariably consider it inconsequential to the integrity of the ultimate verdict. 232
Consequently, even if the appellate opinion points out the prosecutor’s
misconduct, the conviction may nonetheless stand. 233 Generally, the prosecutor
receives no greater punishment than the court’s rebuking remarks. 234 Without
meaningful adverse consequences for prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor
has no incentive to comply with his professional obligations in the future.
C. The Ineffectiveness of Juror Admonitions
Trial court judges may need to admonish juries to keep them focused on their
duties and to remind them to consider only admissible evidence. 235 However,
the belief that “unringing a bell” can cure significant errors disregards the fact
that admonitions, or “curative instructions,” are actually ineffective and may
even aggravate the problems they intend to solve. 236 The purpose of an
admonition is to diminish the prejudicial impact of improper evidence on jurors
229. Gershman, supra note 21, at 160 (citing the “small number” of cases that are reversed
because of prosecutorial misconduct). Indeed, the few cases that are reversed involve conduct
egregious enough to surpass the harmless error standard. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 679 (1985) (describing the difficult burden the defendant must overcome to achieve a
reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct); People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. Gen. Sess.
1946) (ordering a new trial because, according to the judge: “A fraud has been perpetrated on the
court, which requires me to act. A prosecutor cannot be permitted to profit from his own
concealment of the true facts, in derogation of the rights of the defendant.”).
230. Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of
Scrutiny, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1954–57 (2008) (acknowledging the difficulty of succeeding on
a prosecutorial misconduct appeal).
231. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1967) (explaining that convictions need
not be automatically overturned because of misconduct under the harmless error doctrine).
232. Id. at 22.
233. Id. at 21–22.
234. Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do With It?, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 746–47 (2005) (discussing courts’ reluctance to publicly reprimand
prosecutors for identified misconduct, despite having the power to do so); see also Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (emphasizing that the purpose for appellate review is not to punish the
prosecutor, but to ensure that the defendant had a fair trial).
235. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (instructing the trial judge to give a limiting instruction if the
evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not for another); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (instructing
the trial judge to exclude evidence if it is unfairly prejudicial, might mislead the jury, or is a waste
of time).
236. See Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 885–86 (5th Cir. 1962) (recognizing the
inadequacies of curative instructions).
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by instructing them to ignore the objectionable evidence or to limit its use during
deliberations. However, the bulk of research studies suggest that jurors
frequently fail to comply with admonitions to disregard certain evidence entirely
or to limit the application of evidence to specific issues. 237 In fact, in many
cases, admonitions actually increase the prejudicial impact of the presence or
absence of evidence. 238
The manner in which an appellate court reviews prosecutorial error
compounds this problem. 239 Appellate judges typically consider a lower court’s
admonition to the jury to disregard improperly presented evidence an effective
remedy, and therefore have been historically disinclined to overturn a decision
if the error was “cured” at trial. 240 A prosecutor’s knowledge of this tendency
to disregard misconduct is concerning because it may increase his likelihood to
introduce improper evidence or testimony that the jury cannot disregard. Yet,
even though admonitions to disregard improper evidence may increase the
prejudicial impact of evidence and raise the probability for conviction, defense
attorneys must move for an admonition at trial in order to preserve the alleged
error for appeal. 241 The defense may be forced to choose between damaging the
client’s chances of acquittal at trial and the possibility of waiving the right to
appeal on the grounds of the perceived error. 242 This systemic problem thus
reduces the likelihood that prosecutorial errors and misconduct will be remedied
at the trial level.

237. See, e.g., Dale Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,
753–54 (1959) (describing a study conducted to measure the effect of limiting instructions on
juries); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 750 (1988) (arguing that jurors have
difficulty following instructions to disregard evidence).
238. J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71,
86 (1990) (“If jurors are instructed to disregard incriminating evidence, they are more likely to find
the defendant guilty; if instructed to disregard exculpatory evidence, they are more likely to
acquit.”); J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking about Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and
Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 652 (1992) (arguing that limiting instructions are more
harmful than helpful); see also Paul Bergman, Admonishing Jurors to Disregard What They
Haven’t Heard, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (1992) (discussing the concern that juries will
naturally make impermissible inferences without an instruction to the contrary).
239. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1000–02 (1985–1986) (describing the standards by
which appellate courts review error).
240. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, supra note 238, at 99–100.
241. FED. R. EVID. 103 (permitting a party to appeal an error at trial only if he makes a timely
objection). Under the procedural default doctrine, appellate courts do not usually evaluate an issue
unless it was first raised to the trial court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 733–34 (1991).
If a party does not object and request an admonishment at trial, the appellant waives the right to
appeal on that issue. Id.
242. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, supra note 238, at 99–100.
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D. The Unintended Consequence of the Harmless Error Doctrine
As noted earlier, another obstacle to curbing prosecutorial misconduct is the
harmless error doctrine, which effectively condones misconduct. 243 Given the
vast deference that appellate courts grant to trial courts and their verdicts, the
harmless error doctrine treats most prosecutorial trial errors as irrelevant. 244
Even if the appellate court clearly identifies misconduct, it will only overturn a
conviction if the prosecutor’s behavior was harmful error, or error that “affect[s]
the substantial rights of the parties.” 245 The purpose of the harmless error
doctrine is to improve efficiency by preventing multiple trials to address minor
errors. 246 For example, one study involving 2,131 California appellate cases
alleging prosecutorial misconduct found misconduct in 444 cases, or twenty-one
percent. 247 Of these 444 cases, the courts overturned the convictions in fiftyfour. 248 The courts affirmed the convictions in the other 390 cases, reasoning
that the misconduct was harmless. 249
To overcome the harmless error standard in the context of an alleged Brady
violation, the defendant must establish that “there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” 250 More specifically, an appellate court will not
overturn a conviction in cases in which the prosecutor fails to disclose
exculpatory or impeaching evidence unless the court finds that the undisclosed
evidence was “material,” or so important that it “undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” 251 Although it is common sense that a verdict should not
be overturned unless the error made a difference to the decision, it is also
important to recognize that prosecutors who engage in “harmless” error are not
subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny and can continue to commit misconduct
with impunity.
E. The Unintended Consequence of the Plain Error Rule
Much like the harmless error doctrine, the plain error rule unintentionally
ignores, and thus implicitly condones, prosecutorial misconduct. 252 Because
defense counsel’s failure to object to misconduct at trial typically waives the
243. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
244. Id. at 22.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (instructing federal appellate courts to review “the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties”).
246. Preventable Error, supra note 1, at 19.
247. CAL. FINAL REPORT, supra note 126, at 71.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
251. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.
252. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered
even though it was not brought to the court’s attention”); Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability
and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 124 (1998).
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right to appeal unless the error is clear, appellate courts often overlook
prosecutorial misconduct. 253 For instance, in cases involving Brady violations,
courts generally review findings of fact for clear error. 254 If the objection is
timely, the court will review the misconduct to determine whether the prosecutor
violated a rule of trial practice and whether that violation prejudiced the jury. 255
However, if defense counsel does not object at trial, appellate courts use the
much more deferential plain error standard. 256
F. Immunity From Civil Liability
The law entitles prosecutors to absolute immunity for actions taken within the
course and scope of their duties. 257 The breadth of prosecutorial immunity
suggests to prosecutors that they may act without fear of sanction for
misconduct. 258 While prosecutors may be disciplined or even disbarred for their
misconduct, they are virtually free from civil liability. 259 Even exonerated
individuals will rarely prevail against the prosecutors who wrongfully convicted
them, and only in situations in which the prosecutor acted outside the scope of
his position. 260
Most recently, in Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not impose liability on prosecutors for a single Brady
violation. 261 As a result, exonerated individuals now find it more difficult to
obtain redress for their loss of liberty. In Connick, prosecutors conceded shortly
before Thompson’s execution date that they had violated Brady by failing to
disclose a crime lab report that Thompson’s attorneys had discovered. 262
Thompson was acquitted after a second trial, and he subsequently sued the
prosecutor’s office, alleging a Brady violation based on the office’s failure to
provide adequate training for its prosecutors to comply with Brady and other
constitutional requirements. 263 The Court ruled in favor of the prosecutor’s
253. See FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring a timely objection at trial to argue an error on appeal).
254. Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005).
255. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 415 n.90; Gershman, supra note 252, at 124.
256. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 423–24; see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163
& n.14 (1982) (noting that the plain error standard is used only in exceptional circumstances and
only if the error is extremely obvious).
257. Rosen, supra note 13, at 731–32.
258. Preventable Error, supra note 1, at 75 (“Absolute immunity allows prosecutors to commit
misconduct with impunity, knowing that they are immune from any consequences, even if they act
intentionally, in bad faith, or with malice.”).
259. Id. at 74 (explaining that prosecutors cannot be sued personally for actions taken within
the scope of their duties).
260. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (discussing liability for non-prosecutorial
conduct); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 66.
261. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356; see also Monell v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978) (discussing § 1983 liability more generally).
262. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57.
263. Editorial, Justice and Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A26.
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office, justifying its holding by relying on the fact that prosecutors can be
punished for ethical violations with professional discipline, including sanctions,
suspension, and disbarment.” 264 One commentator noted that this ruling gives
prosecutors “nearly absolute immunity against civil suits.” 265 Indeed, after
Connick, a plaintiff who seeks relief under § 1983 must prove that “action
pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury.” 266
Official municipal policies require training programs for inexperienced
prosecutors. To impose liability, failure to educate certain employees about their
legal duties must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.” 267 Deliberate indifference
requires policymakers to disregard the “known or obvious consequence[s]” of
the deficiencies of their training programs, thereby leading employees to violate
citizens’ constitutional rights. 268 A pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate
indifference. 269
In Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court hypothesized a “single-incident”
liability, meaning that an “obvious” Brady violation can substitute for the pattern
of violations “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference. 270
In Connick, the Court found that the failure to train prosecutors regarding Brady
issues does not fall within the narrow range of “single-incident” liability because
attorneys receive unique training in legal writing before entering the profession,
must satisfy CLE requirements, often receive on-the-job training from more
experienced attorneys, and have ethical obligations to understand the
requirements Brady imposes and to perform legal research if they are uncertain
about a matter. 271
VI. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
This Article is not the first (and certainly not the last) to propose a solution to
the ongoing problem of prosecutorial misconduct. In particular, four previous
articles have identified such misconduct and have set forth thoughtful proposals.
This Article builds on the solid foundations offered by this previous scholarship.
Professor Richard Rosen proposes greater disciplinary sanctions to remedy
rampant Brady violations. He acknowledges that, in one way or another, all fifty
states have adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules to govern the conduct of

264. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1354; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
267. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
268. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1997)
(discussing the standard for liability for civil suits against city officials).
269. Id. at 409.
270. Id. at 399–400.
271. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361–62.
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attorneys. 272 Rosen maintains that, although the Rules should deter prosecutors
from acting in bad faith, the reality is that bar disciplinary bodies simply do not
adequately fulfill their duties, rendering the Rules largely ineffective. 273
Rosen suggests three ways to correct this problem: (1) granting state bars the
authority to review cases for misconduct and to initiate disciplinary proceedings,
independent of individually filed complaints; 274 (2) imposing harsher penalties
for Brady-type misconduct; 275 and (3) reversing convictions based on bad-faith
misconduct. 276 Rosen argues that the suggested bad-faith standard is easily
based on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, arguing that, if the
exclusionary rule can punish police officers, it can also punish prosecutors. 277
Joseph Weeks, another author who has proposed methods of regulating the
conduct of prosecutors, would hold prosecutors personally liable for damages
sustained by the defendant if there is evidence of wrongful imprisonment. 278
Weeks argues that an extreme form of liability is necessary because there is
currently no mechanism to prevent prosecutors from withholding exculpatory
evidence other than the remote possibility that the conviction may be
overturned. 279 Weeks dismisses civil suits as an effective form of deterrence
because of the qualified immunity that protects public officials for unintentional
constitutional violations. 280
Through a fifty-state survey, Weeks demonstrates that criminal defendants
have little to gain by seeking bar association review of a prosecutor’s
misconduct. 281 His survey establishes an utter lack of prosecutorial guidelines.
Of nine cases involving Brady violations, courts imposed no punishment in three
cases, imposed minor sanctions in four cases, suspended the prosecutor in one
case, and removed the prosecutor from office in the final case. 282 Similarly, the
272. Rosen, supra note 13, at 733, 735–36.
273. Id. at 731–32 (“Effectively insulated from disciplinary punishment and immune from civil
suit, a prosecutor contemplating Brady-type misconduct knows that the only possible legal
consequence of presenting false evidence or suppressing exculpatory evidence is that the defendant
may be fortunate enough to discover the evidence and file for post-conviction relief.”).
274. Id. at 697. Rosen posits that this mechanism is necessary because actually calling
prosecutors before the disciplinary body for review is very difficult. Id. at 733.
275. Id. at 697. Rosen claims that the reluctance of the review boards and courts to impose
strong sanctions in cases in which an individual alleges misconduct is evidence enough that
change is necessary. Id. at 733.
276. Id. at 697. Courts should reverse convictions if the prosecutor intentionally suppressed
exculpatory evidence or presented false evidence. Id. at 739.
277. Id. at 737. The court first invoked the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 4th
Amendment violations. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
278. Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty
of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 928 (1997).
279. Id. at 931.
280. Id. at 871.
281. Id. at 898 (noting that criminal defendants generally seek only two remedies: reversal or
a reduction in sentence).
282. Id. at 881.
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state bar association had never filed a formal Brady complaint in thirty-five of
the forty-one states that participated in the study. 283 As a result of this lack of
accountability, Weeks suggest that defendants should be permitted to sue
prosecutors directly, and that the state subsequently indemnify the prosecutor
for any damages incurred. 284 He argues that this will allow the defendant to
receive compensatory damages proportionate to the sentence imposed by his
conviction. 285 While this proposal provides monetary relief to the defendant, a
disciplinary scheme that imposes bar sanctions on prosecutors found personally
liable for misconduct is still necessary.
Peter A. Joy suggests that prosecutorial misconduct largely results from three
institutional conditions: (1) vague ethics rules; (2) vast discretionary authority
with little to no transparency; and (3) inadequate remedies for prosecutorial
misconduct, which create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather
than refrain from, prosecutorial misconduct. 286 Joy argues for the adoption of
the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, which “provide examples of the types
of norms that should be considered in clearly defining the prosecutor’s ethical
duties.” 287 The Standards require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence
to a grand jury, ensure that there is sufficient admissible evidence before filing
charges, and disclose Brady material in a timely manner. 288 Conversely, the
Standards prohibit prosecutors from cross-examining truthful witnesses to
discredit or undermine their testimony, asking questions that imply the existence
of a fact in which the prosecutor does not have a good faith belief; and making
arguments to the jury that would divert them from deciding the case on the
evidence. 289
Although greater specificity regarding prosecutorial misconduct would
provide better guidance, the provisions set forth in the Standards are well known
to the criminal justice community. 290 Even though some ambiguity regarding
Brady disclosures persists, the core of the Brady disclosure requirements is well
established. 291
Joy’s second recommendation is to provide more transparent oversight of
prosecutors’ exercise of their vast discretionary power. 292 Drawing once more
from the proposed Standards, Joy suggests the drafting of a “prosecutor’s
283. Id.
284. Id. at 929.
285. Id.
286. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2006).
287. Id. at 418.
288. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3 (1993).
289. Id. at § 3-5.
290. Joy, supra note 286, at 401.
291. Id. at 412.
292. Id. at 420–21.
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handbook” to provide greater clarity and transparency. 293 Based on the version
of the Standards in effect at the time of Joy’s article, such a policy manual would
be publicly accessible. 294 Joy argues that a clear policy manual would facilitate
internal discipline, which would be a significant step in adequately punishing
prosecutorial misconduct. 295
Joy’s final recommendation suggests a more proactive approach, which would
require prosecutors’ offices
to implement a system of graduated discipline each time there is a
finding by a trial judge or appellate court of prosecutorial misconduct.
Bar disciplinary authorities should implement a system to review
reported instances of prosecutorial misconduct and, when they deem
it appropriate, conduct investigations or recommend discipline. 296
Joy’s proposal for greater transparency and clearer guidelines is essential to
any proposal to address prosecutorial misconduct. As Joy argues, a more
proactive approach that imposes tighter controls on prosecutors should be
undertaken.
Finally, Ellen Yaroshefsky proposes improved internal practices and policies
in prosecutors’ offices, such as “clear, written disclosure standards” and
“effective hiring, training, supervising, and monitoring” of prosecutors. 297
Additionally, Yaroshefsky highlights the problems that arise from a prosecutor’s
evaluation of possible Brady information, his determination of the information’s
materiality, and his decision of whether to disclose it. 298 Yaroshefsky warns
that, because of “[c]ognitive biases such as tunnel vision and confirmation bias,”
a prosecutor’s belief in a defendant’s guilt is likely to impair his judgment
regarding the information’s materiality. 299 Materiality, therefore, should not
play a role in the pretrial assessment of which information should be disclosed.
Instead, prosecutors should err on the side of too much disclosure. 300
Yaroshefsky further suggests the creation of a Conviction Integrity Unit within
the district attorney’s office that would audit cases resulting in wrongful

293. Id. at 421 (proposing a handbook that contains a “statement of (i) general policies to guide
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and (ii) procedures of the office”).
294. Id. at 422 (quoting NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
§ 10.3 (1991)) (recommending that the policy manual “should be subject to access by the general
public and/or law enforcement agencies or the defense bar”).
295. Id. at 424.
296. Id. at 427.
297. Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v.
Thompson, 15 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 913, 936 (2012). Although Yaroshefsky focuses on the issues
specifically affecting Orleans Parish in Louisiana, her suggestions for reform are more widely and
generally applicable.
298. Id. at 936–37.
299. Id. at 937.
300. Id. at 937–38.
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convictions to identify errors and subsequently institute new procedures to
prevent similar future wrongful convictions. 301
Yaroshefsky also advocates for open file discovery, which “requires the
prosecutor to provide the complete investigative files, including any material
obtained by law enforcement, to the defense before trial including investigators’
notes, the required recordation of all oral statements, and any other information
obtained during the investigation.” 302
Lastly, Yaroshefsky urges for the implementation of a system of external
accountability, which would require greater and more effective supervision and
discipline by the state bar association and the state supreme court. 303 She further
calls on judges to take a more active role in the supervision of disclosure
practices by conducting a pretrial conference to ensure that the parties
understand and have fulfilled the disclosure and ethical obligations. 304
In addition to Rosen, Weeks, Joy, and Yaroshefsky, a number of other
commentators have suggested various other approaches to address prosecutorial
misconduct. 305 Specifically, several commentators have proposed some form of
commission dedicated solely to the oversight of prosecutors. 306
VII. THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION MODEL
The various schemes designed to deal with prosecutorial misconduct and the
various proposals advanced by academics over the years, coupled with the
reality that prosecutorial misconduct is rarely reported, raise serious questions
as to whether any scheme can be effective. Compounding this problem is the
fact that, even if prosecutorial misconduct is reported, there is no viable body to
investigate or discipline the guilty party. Nevertheless, the regulatory schemes
currently in place to investigate and discipline judges may serve as helpful

301. Id. at 938.
302. Id. at 939; Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1329, 1371–72 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the benefits of open file discovery). Ohio and North Carolina already implement
this method. See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2011).
303. Yaroshefsky, supra note 297, at 940–41.
304. Id. at 940.
305. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 21, at 453–55. Gershman builds on Steele’s proposal of
a committee modeling the Texas Statute for prosecutor misconduct commissions. Id. at 354. He
suggests that prosecutors’ distinct role, as well as their ability to exercise a “quasi-judicial”
function, requires a commission to monitor their conduct and ensure that they fulfill their ethical
duties. Id. He proposes modeling these commissions on the already existing independent judicial
committees. Id. Another commentator recommends implementing a similar mechanism. Minsker,
supra note 21. Another commentator recognizes the need for an independent prosecutorial
commission (IPC), and expands on Gershman’s proposal by suggesting that such a committee
regulate, discipline, and disclose the prosecutors’ names, the outcome of an investigation, and the
discipline that was imposed. Morey, supra note 21, at 636, 639.
306. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 21 at 982 (proposing that every state follow the Texas model
of a commission solely dedicated to the policing and sanctioning of prosecutors).
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models for future regulation of prosecutors. 307 All fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government maintain judicial conduct commissions
to protect and foster confidence in the criminal justice system. 308
To effectively fulfill their duties, judges, like prosecutors, must be free to
operate with autonomy within the bounds of their ethical and professional
duties. 309 Any concern that an independent body monitoring the actions of the
court may affect judges’ independent authority has largely been laid to rest. 310
Given the similarly sensitive positions of both judges and prosecutors, the
judicial commission model as a matrix for prosecutorial commissions may
present a viable solution.
In 1960, California became the first jurisdiction to establish a judicial conduct
commission. 311 The commission was part of a package of judicial
administration reform legislation intended to provide “real protection against
incompetency, misconduct or non-performance of duty” from judicial
officials. 312 The purpose of the commission was not to sanction judges, but to
protect the public. 313 The authority of the commission was limited to protecting
the independence of the judiciary so that judges would remain free to make
unpopular decisions without fear of discipline. 314 By 1981, every state and the
District of Columbia followed California’s example and established their own

307. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The Federal Judicial
Misconduct Statutes and the Breyer Committee Report, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 426 (2007) (discussing the
procedure judges follow if they are accused of misconduct).
308. Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405, 405
(2007).
309. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial
Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 121 (2008)
(describing the importance of judicial autonomy).
310. See Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1239
(2000) (noting the general acceptance of independent oversight of judicial conduct, especially in
state courts).
311. Jonathan Abel, Testing Three Commonsense Intuitions About Judicial Conduct
Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2012). California voters approved the commission
and voted for it by a margin of three to one. Id. at 1029.
312. Meeting Agenda, CAL. ASSEMBLY BUDGET SUBCOMM. NO. 4, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2004).
313. Gray, supra note 308, at 405.
314. Id. at 408 (“The power of conduct commissions is limited to protect the independence of
the judiciary; a judge must feel free to make a decision that may provoke complaints without fearing
that he or she will be disciplined by the commission.”).
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judicial conduct commissions. 315 Similarly, in 1980, the federal government
established its own commission. 316
Judicial conduct commissions are similar in structure. Each is a state
administrative agency that receives complaints made by private citizens,
investigates alleged misconduct, and submits cases of misconduct for
adjudication within the commission. 317 However, judicial conduct commissions
differ in two significant ways: the range of sanctions available to the
commission, and whether the commission has final authority on sanctions. 318
Every state allows its commission to remove a judge for severe or willful
misconduct. 319 Additionally, most commissions employ a range of less severe
sanctions, including suspension, public censure, and a wide variety of private
disciplinary measures. 320 However, California is the only jurisdiction in which
the judicial commission has the authority to remove a judge from office on its
own initiative. 321 While other state commissions can remove judges from office,
the state supreme court must approve any censure or removal action. 322

315. Id. at 406 (noting that twenty-eight states established commissions by provisions in their
constitutions, sixteen states established commissions by statute, and seven established commissions
by court rule). The number of members of a judicial conduct commission varies by state. Id. At
one extreme, Ohio’s commission has twenty-eight members. Id. At the other, Montana’s
commission is comprised of only five members. Id. The commissions often include judges,
attorneys, and private citizens. Id. (noting that a majority of commissioners California, Hawaii,
Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin are laypersons). In
some states, judges are appointed to the board, based on the court in which they sit. Id. For
example, the Arizona Constitution requires that the commission include two appellate court judges,
one justice of the peace, one municipal court judge, two attorneys, and three private citizens. Id.
316. Judicial Code and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2006).
317. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029. In Texas, for example, the commission consists of thirteen
members, six judges appointed by the Texas Supreme Court, five citizen members appointed by
the governor, and two attorneys appointed by the bar. STATE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT 10 (2012) [hereinafter SUNSET ADVISORY
COMMISSION], available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/FinalSunsetStaffReport.pdf. The
commission members serve six-year staggered terms and meet six times a year. Id.
318. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029–30.
319. Id. at 1030–31.
320. Gray, supra note 308, at 406 (“A judge commits willful misconduct if the judge violates
the code of judicial conduct while acting in a judicial capacity and with malice or in bad faith.”).
321. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029–30.
322. SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 317, at 5. The Texas Sunset Advisory
Commission on Judicial Conduct, in its 2012 annual report, was critical of the limited range of
penalties available to judicial commissions following formal proceedings. The Advisory
Commission maintained that such limitations deter the judicial commission from pursuing cases of
public import in open proceedings. Id. The Advisory Commission further maintained that
confidence in the judiciary rests on high-profile cases being heard openly. Id. The Texas advisory
commissioners maintain that granting greater authority to sanction and opening hearings to the
public would help alleviate two of the problems most judicial commissions struggle to address:
public confidence in the court system through a balance of judicial independence and accountability
and transparency in proceedings. Id.
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There is also some variation in a commission’s authority to impose sanctions
on a judge once he has retired or otherwise left office. In some jurisdictions, the
commission loses jurisdiction and the proceedings are considered moot. 323
However, most states allow commissions to impose sanctions even after a judge
has left the bench. 324
A. Triggering an Inquiry
Complaints against judges, which must be filed with the proper court office,
can be filed by anyone. 325 There are few restrictions. 326 Any person can write
a complaint letter to the commission, 327 and, in some states, complete a form
available online. 328 Generally, a complaint letter must include the name of the
judge or official, the name of the court on which the judge sits, a detailed
explanation of alleged misconduct, the names and contact information of any
witnesses, the date(s) of the alleged misconduct, the type of case in which the
misconduct occurred, and the complainant’s relationship to the case. 329
B. An Initial Screening
Upon receipt of a complaint, a commission conducts an initial screening to
determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant an investigation. 330 In
preparation for this initial screening, a commission’s legal staff is responsible
for evaluating the complaint, researching relevant legal issues, and seeking any
additional necessary information. 331 However, the legal staff does not conduct
the investigation or contact the judge or court personnel. Rather, the commission
reviews the complaint and the staff’s evaluation, and then decides whether to
dismiss the complaint or to authorize its staff to conduct a further inquiry. 332
323. Gray, supra note 308, at 409.
324. Id. One policy reason in support of sanctions following a judge after they have left the
bench is the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, because the alternative, silence,
may be observed by the public as overlooking the wrongdoing, or, worse yet, condoning it. Id.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2006).
326. Id. (detailing the procedure to address possible misconduct); see also Helman, supra note
307, at 427. The process begins with the filing of a complaint about a judge with the clerk of the
appropriate court (the court of appeals for that circuit). 28 U.S.C. § 351.
327. 28 U.S.C. § 3651(a).
328. How to File a Complaint, STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
http://cjp.ca.gov/file_a_complaint.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (providing a link for a printable
form).
329. Id.
330. Hellman, supra note 307, at 428 (describing the procedure one must follow to file a
complaint against a judge).
331. The Complaint Process, STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
http://cjp.ca.gov/complaint_process.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
332. See, e.g., id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2006). Cases filed by prisoners and litigants
against judges are historically dismissed ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of the time, whereas
those filed by attorneys, court personnel or public officials are dismissed only thirty-seven percent
of the time. Lara A. Bazelon, Putting Mice the in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges
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Following a further inquiry, the commission can close or dismiss the complaint,
issue an advisory letter, or commence a preliminary investigation. 333 In most
jurisdictions, the commission will not notify the judge of a pending complaint
until it has authorized a preliminary investigation. 334
C. The Investigative Stage
During the investigation phase, a commission may contact witnesses, review
court records and other documents, observe court proceedings, or oversee any
other appropriate means of investigation. 335 After the initial investigation, the
commission typically asks the judge to respond to the allegations of misconduct,
after which it may decide to dismiss the complaint. 336 If dismissal is not
warranted, the commission may issue notice of its intent to privately admonish
the judge, issue notice of its intent to publicly admonish the judge, or institute
formal proceedings against the judge. 337 If the commission chooses to admonish
the judge, the judge has the right to contest the admonishment before the
commission or to request a formal hearing. 338 If the judge demands an
appearance before the commission, it will review the record, consider the
judge’s arguments, and determine whether to close the complaint, issue an
advisory letter, 339 or go forward with a private 340 or public 341 admonishment.

Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J.
439, 468–69 (2009).
333. See The Complaint Process, supra note 331.
334. See, e.g., How to File a Complaint, supra note 328.
335. See STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2011) [hereinafter CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs
/annual_reports/2011_%20Annual_Report_03-29-12(1).puff.
336. See, e.g., id.
337. See, e.g., id. at 2.
338. See, e.g., id. at 3–5.
339. See, e.g., id. at 5. An advisory letter is a sanction available only after an investigation,
following a staff inquiry or a preliminary investigation has been conducted and the opportunity of
the judge to respond to the allegations. Id. Such sanction is proper when the commission
determines that the judicial officer acted inappropriately but the misconduct was relatively minor.
Id. This confidential letter advises the judge to use caution or expresses disapproval of the judge’s
conduct. Id.
340. Id. More serious misconduct may warrant a private admonishment. Id. The commission
sends confidential notice to the judge describing the improper conduct and the conclusions reached
by the commission. Id. The commission advises the complainant that it has taken corrective action,
but it does not disclose specific details. Id. Pursuant to the California Constitution, the governor
of any state, the president of the United States, or the Commission on Judicial Appointment may
request the private admonishment or advisory letter for a judge who is under consideration for
judicial appointment. Id.
341. See, e.g., id. When misconduct warrants a more severe sanction than private discipline,
including public admonishment or public censure, the commission notifies the judge and makes the
sanction available to the complainant, the press, and the general public. Id. A public censure is
appropriate after a hearing or without a hearing if the judge consents. Id. In cases involving
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These options protect the judge from a formal proceeding; the commission
conducts a hearing only if the judge requests it or, following a preliminary
investigation, a hearing is necessary. 342
D. The Hearing
Hearings are typically conducted before special masters appointed by the
highest court in the jurisdiction. 343 At the hearing, the judge or justice is
afforded counsel and, in most jurisdictions, the right to confront the individual
or individuals who filed the complaint. 344 However, the complainant does not
have the right to appear, and the extent to which he is involved in the proceedings
is at the discretion of the special master. 345 The commission will only give the
complainant the opportunity to testify if he has additional relevant evidence
beyond what already exists. 346 Typically, the evidence must establish
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. 347 After the hearing, the special
master reports his conclusion and recommendations to the commission. 348
E. The Sanctions
A commission, in considering the special master’s findings, can recommend
to the jurisdiction’s highest court that the judge be removed from office. 349 The
commission can also impose a less serious punishment, including an advisory
letter, public or private admonishment, or suspension with or without pay. 350 A
commission will typically only remove a judge from office if his “conduct is
fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.” 351 In
deciding what sanctions to apply, most states use the factors developed by the
Washington Supreme Court in In re Deming:
particularly severe misconduct, the commission may prevent the judge from taking further state
court assignment. Id. The most serious sanction is removal, which requires a hearing. Id.
342. See, e.g., id. at 5.
343. See, e.g., id.
344. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(2) (2006).
345. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(3) (2006).
346. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(3) (stating that the complainant may be permitted to appear at hearings
under certain circumstances).
347. 28 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); see Gray, supra note 308, at 413 (“In thirty-four states, if the
commission finds probable cause to believe that a judge has committed misconduct justifying a
formal disciplinary proceeding, confidentiality ceases, and the formal charges, the judges answer,
and subsequent proceedings, including the hearing and the commission’s decision, are public.”).
348. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 16.
As part of its determination, the special master, in addition to determining whether the complaint
has merit, will determine whether the violation constituted “willful misconduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 354
(2006).
349. Id.
350. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2.
351. James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of Misconduct, 30 NOVA L. REV.
349, 357 (2006) (noting that removal is only considered in especially egregious circumstances).
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(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a
pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence
of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or
out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the
judge’s official capacity or in his private life; (e) whether the judge
has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the
judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct; (g) the
length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have been prior
complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the
integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which
the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires. 352
The judge has the right appeal the punishment to the jurisdiction’s highest
court. 353
VIII. A NEW PROPOSAL: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL
OVERSIGHT
There are a number of ways to remedy the problems with the current
disciplinary systems for prosecutorial misconduct.
Clearer guidelines
establishing prosecutors’ duties and obligations would be beneficial. 354
Unfortunately, because much of the misconduct is of a knowing and deliberate
nature, clearly defined parameters would most likely prove inconsequential.
Some scholars suggest tightening internal security within prosecutors’ offices as
a corrective measure. 355 However, internal discipline has also proven
ineffective. 356 One commentator proposes denying immunity to prosecutors
who engage in unethical, deliberate and knowing conduct. 357 While the policy
goals underlying prosecutorial immunity are no longer compelling, modifying
the doctrine presents severe challenges. A more realistic approach is to reduce
the standard for reversal from harmless error to reasonable possibility, which
would motivate prosecutors to fulfill their ethical obligations to ensure that
appellate courts will uphold the convictions they secure on appeal. 358
However, these “remedies” remain at the periphery of the real concern. There
must be measured and proportionate consequences for behavior that falls below
the high standards that prosecutors are expected to meet. The cost of misconduct
352. 736 P.2d 639, 659 (1987). When considering what sanctions to apply, the Florida courts,
as well as the state commission, evaluate factors beyond the misconduct itself, such as past
behavior, judicial experience, extenuating circumstances, pattern of behavior, motive,
remorsefulness, repentance, rehabilitation effort in an individual case, and the judge’s candor or
lack thereof. Wolf, supra note 351, at 355–56.
353. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2.
354. Yaroshefsky, supra note 297, at 936–37.
355. Id. at 936.
356. See id. at 935–36.
357. Weeks, supra note 278, at 836.
358. Id. at 839–840.
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is too great to both the integrity of the criminal justice system and to the
individuals who suffer because of a prosecutor’s misdeeds. Although some
scholars have offered their proposals for some manner of state prosecutorial
commissions, this Article proposes a specific plan for such commissions. A
prosecutorial oversight commission should be designed to induce reporting of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, while at the same time preserving prosecutors’
independence, autonomy, and discretionary authority.
State-authorized
prosecutorial commissions can accomplish for prosecutorial integrity and
accountability what judicial commissions have accomplished for judicial
integrity and accountability. This calls for a tiered response to all allegations of
misconduct. A diverse make-up of commission members and enhanced
reporting requirements would foster a transparent process that recognizes the
need for prosecutorial independence, as well as investigative and adjudicatory
procedures to ensure due process.
A. A Tiered Response
All initial claims of misconduct will be reviewed by a three-member screening
committee, comprised of a retired judge, a retired criminal trial lawyer, and a
layperson. The governor or the chief justice of the state’s highest court will
appoint all members of the committee. Most claims of prosecutorial error will
likely be dismissed, just as most claims presented to judicial commissions are
dismissed at the analogous phase. 359 However, should two of the three members
believe by, a preponderance of the evidence, that error occurred, the committee
would send the matter to the full commission for investigation, hearing, and, if
necessary, determination of sanctions.
A special prosecutor will be appointed to investigate, and ultimately to
prosecute, the claim before the full commission. The prosecutor accused of
misconduct will have the right to counsel, whether retained or appointed. A
two-thirds majority of the full commission will evaluate the claim using a clear
and convincing standard. The commission will then make the following
findings: whether misconduct occurred; second, whether the error was deliberate
or inadvertent; and third, whether a reasonable probability exists that the error
affected the criminal case. Requiring these separate findings allows the
commission to recognize different levels of severity of the prosecutor’s conduct,
which the commission will take into account when determining the sanctions
that will follow a finding of misconduct. Just as deliberate misconduct will draw
harsher sanctions than inadvertent misconduct, misconduct that had a reasonable
probability of affecting the jury will be considered a more significant error and
will also draw harsher sanctions. The range of options available to the
commission following a finding of misconduct should include public reprimand,
fines, suspension, and disbarment.

359. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 12, at 717 & n. 129 (citing the rate of dismissal in California).
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B. A Diverse Commission
Commission membership should be evenly divided between experts in the
field of criminal justice and laypersons. The experts—retired judges, former
prosecutors, and seasoned defense attorneys—will be familiar with the
requirements and practicalities of the prosecutorial function, and will thus be
able to provide guidance for the laypersons. The inclusion of laypersons will
lend credibility to the commissions’ actions, partly by alleviating concerns that
the experts are protecting their peers from the consequences of misconduct.
C. Enhanced Reporting
After states established judicial conduct commissions, complaints against
judges increased significantly. 360 The reason for the increase in reporting is
subject to different interpretations, but the creation of bodies specifically
designed to address judicial misconduct must have had some bearing on the
surge of complaints. Likewise, a body specifically tasked with the investigation
of prosecutors is likely to motivate private citizens, as well as other lawyers and
judges, to more readily report misconduct. 361 While state bar organizations have
historically devoted little attention or effort to investigating—let alone
disciplining—prosecutors, a prosecutorial commission would focus their
energies exclusively on prosecutor misconduct.
Additionally, appellate review of all cases citing prosecutorial error would
further encourage the reporting of prosecutorial. Under this proposal, an
appellate court opinion citing prosecutorial misconduct will automatically come
before the commission for review, regardless of the court’s holding.
Consequently, the harmless error or plain error doctrines will not preclude
review of the misconduct.

360. The Complaint Process, supra note 331. Before 1995, the Commission was only
authorized to make recommendations to the California Supreme Court, which had the authority to
discipline a judge for misconduct. Public Discipline & Decisions 1961–Present, STATE OF CAL.
COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/pub_discipline_and_decisions.htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). Between 1961 and 1995, the California Supreme Court disciplined
thirty-six judges: fifteen removals, including one contested retirement; twenty censures; and one
uncontested involuntary retirement. Id. Since authorized to impose sanctions, the Commission has
disciplined 131 judges. Id. Between 1988 and 1995, the Commission’s authority to impose
disciplinary measures was limited to public reprovals, which required the consent of the judge. Id.
Reports indicate that the commission made seventeen public reprovals during these six years. Id.
The 1995 amendments to the California Constitution shifted the authority to impose all disciplinary
measures from the Supreme Court to the commission, including removal of a judge from the bench
for unraveled misconduct. Id. The Supreme Court maintains only discretionary review of
disciplinary actions. Id. The sanction of public reproval was replaced by the sanction of public
admonishment. Id. Since 1995, the commission has made seventy-four public admonishments,
twenty-nine public censures, and one private admonishment. Id.
361. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2.
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D. A Transparent Process
The commission’s process must strike a balance between the public’s right to
know when a public official is being investigated and a concern for the
prosecutor’s professional reputation. A prosecutorial commission should adopt
the compromise of most judicial commissions: the commission will refrain from
public disclosure during the preliminary investigation stage. 362 Because the
overwhelming number of complaints against judges ultimately lack merit, there
is no public benefit to disclosure at the beginning of the investigation. 363
However, once a complaint survives initial scrutiny, the public should has the
right to notice of all proceedings and sanctions imposed.
E. Recognizing and Preserving Prosecutorial Independence
Prosecutor commissions, like judicial commissions, raise important concerns
about interference with prosecutorial autonomy, which is critical to both
prosecutors’ and judges’ abilities to perform their duties successfully. The
experts on the commission, who will understand and value prosecutorial
independence, will work to preserve autonomy and, if necessary, serve as a
check on the lay commissioners, who may not fully appreciate its importance.
F. Investigative and Adjudicatory Procedures that Ensure Due Process
The structure and procedure the prosecutorial conduct commissions must
ensure due process. The prosecutor under investigation must receive timely
notice of the complaint. He must be afforded counsel at his request. The
adjudicatory process must be before a competent and impartial body, and should
there be a finding of misconduct a wholly separate body must mete out any
sanctions.
IX. CONCLUSION
Establishing prosecutorial conduct commissions will receive scant support
from legislatures reluctant to fight against the tide of public opinion, which
views any efforts on behalf of convicted defendants as anti-law enforcement and
pro-criminal. Yet, the wave of public awareness of wrongful convictions
resulting from overzealous prosecutions should provide some shelter for those
lawmakers with the courage and conviction to press for meaningful reform.
Reining in prosecutorial misconduct should be viewed as a core societal concern.
Our criminal justice system is at its fairest when all those who come within its
sphere receive the full measure of their constitutional protection.

362. Id.
363. Id.
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